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I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of antitrust law has narrowed over the past forty years.1
Today, there is a consensus that antitrust law should, as its sole pur-
pose, promote the economic interests of consumers.2 To achieve this
end, modern antitrust law scrutinizes anticompetitive practices that
tend to increase prices or reduce output.3 Lesser understood, however,
1. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare
Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2405–06 (2013) (explaining how the
judicial and scholarly evolution of antitrust law, which began in the 1970s, led
antitrust law to adopt an exclusively economic perspective, shedding social and
political goals).
2. Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 133, 133–34 (2010) (“All antitrust lawyers and economists know that the
stated instrumental goal of antitrust laws is ‘consumer welfare,’ which is a de-
fined term in economics.”); Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 2405–06; see also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2
(2005) (asserting that since antitrust’s “counterrevolution of the 1970s and 1980s
. . . [,] [t]he only articulated goal of the antitrust laws is to benefit consumers, who
are best off when markets are competitive”).
3. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV.
59–60 (2010) (“[T]here is widespread agreement that monopoly, which is charac-
terized by artificially high prices and low levels of market output, is undesir-
able.”); Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy
for the Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1669–70 (2013) [hereinafter Shelanski,
Competition Policy] (“Conventional antitrust analysis focuses on the relationship
between firms’ conduct and market performance, as measured through prices and
output levels of relevant products and services.”). The view that antitrust law’s
primary focuses are increased prices and reduced output remains true when
studying only merger review. See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merg-
ers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (“At the heart of merger policy
is antitrust law’s presumption that greater competition in the form of reduced
product-market concentration brings improved market performance and in-
creased consumer benefits in the form of lower prices, higher quality, and higher
output.”). These same concerns are paramount in antitrust cases challenging ex-
clusionary behavior. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir.
2016). Further, antitrust actions initiated by private actors must allege an “anti-
trust injury,” which, likewise, concerns higher prices and reduced output. Wag-
ner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673, 681 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(“The antitrust injury doctrine requires that every antitrust plaintiff show that
his loss results from actions that reduce output or raise prices to consumers.”); see
also Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
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is the manner in which innovation fits into this framework.4 Although
few deny that innovation enhances consumer welfare, the preserva-
tion of the market’s incentives to innovate did not become a serious
objective of antitrust litigation until the 1990s.5 At the forefront of
this development have been the two antitrust agencies—the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice Antitrust Di-
vision (DOJ)—which have both sought to make innovation a greater
focus of competition law.6
The value of promoting innovation through antitrust law can
hardly be understated. Economists take it as settled that innovation is
one of the primary determinants of economic growth.7 In addition to
the superior goods and methods introduced by innovation, the activity
of research and development (R&D) creates “spillover effects” that in-
clude boosting human capital, investment, and employment.8 As a re-
sult, antitrust’s ability to generate innovation may benefit society
more than its conventional purpose of fostering competitive prices.9
Innovation, though, may struggle to flourish in uncompetitive mar-
kets, especially when a firm has accrued overly concentrated market
power. This is because once an actor gains monopoly power, the moti-
vation to innovate can dissipate. As one commentator explained, “the
monopolist faces little incentive to innovate because a new innovation
(alleging defendants attempted to eliminate competition in the distribution of
baseball and hockey games); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered
Antitrust Injury in the Microsoft Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 831 (2001)
(“The most reliable measure [of an antitrust injury] is the immediate effect of the
practice on output and prices.”).
4. See Richard J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging Innovation into Antitrust
Agency Enforcement of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1919, 1921 (2015)
(stating that antitrust law has “struggled” to incorporate innovation into its juris-
prudence); David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust
Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 733 (2001) (discussing the uncertainty obscur-
ing the relationship between antitrust law and innovation).
5. See Gilbert & Greene, supra note 4, at 1926 (noting that the agencies did not
incorporate innovation into merger policy until 1992).
6. See, e.g., J. THOMAS ROSCH, FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST REGULATION OF INNO-
VATION MARKETS 5–9 (2009) (discussing the emphasis that the agencies are giving
to innovation and innovation markets).
7. NATHAN ROSENBERG, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2004) (“It is taken as
axiomatic that innovative activity has been the single, most important compo-
nent of long-term economic growth . . . .”).
8. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 7 (1996) (explaining the benefits of knowledge-based economic systems
that emphasize science and technology, including increases in highly skilled
labor).
9. Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innova-
tion, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 576 (2007); Shelanski, Competition Policy, supra
note 3, at 1674 (“Antitrust authorities and scholars have long maintained that
innovation is more important to economic growth and social welfare than price
competition among existing products.”).
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would not increase the monopolist’s market share.”10 In fact, monopo-
lists may insulate their market power by obstructing competitors from
innovating technology that would compete against their product
lines.11 For example, with respect to corporate mergers, a firm can
curtail the R&D efforts of a rival company by acquiring and dissolving
that company, reducing competition and innovation.12 Likewise, an
inventor may refuse to license her patented technology to competitors
whose ability to innovate depends upon, or would benefit from, using
that technology.13 In this view, innovation is a form of competition.
Even though a lack of competition can stifle innovation, there is
strong disagreement about whether antitrust offers a suitable rem-
edy.14 The case in favor of making innovation a goal of antitrust law is
that antitrust enforcement advances competition, which forces firms
to innovate as a means of surviving the competition. Since the FTC
and DOJ formally adopted this position, antitrust filings—by both the
agencies and private parties—have increasingly asserted that dimin-
ished innovation qualifies as an antitrust violation.15 For example, in
2017, the FTC claimed that Qualcomm transgressed antitrust law by
making and then breaching commitments to license certain patents to
competitors, “reduc[ing] competitors’ ability and incentive to invest
and innovate” along with other anticompetitive harms.16
10. William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and Pro-
ductive Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2079 (2014); see also McGowan, supra
note 4, at 733 (remarking that those with market power would prefer to protect
their market power, even at the behest of innovation).
11. SUSAN S. DESANTI ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 13 (2003) (assert-
ing that patent rights can cause the patentee to “obtain unwarranted market
power or interfere with competition in a variety of ways”).
12. Baker, supra note 9, at 592; see also United States v. Anthem, Inc., No. 16-1493,
2017 WL 527923, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2017) (alleging that a proposed merger
would eliminate competition, reducing innovation); Michael A. Carrier, Two Puz-
zles Resolved: of the Schumpeter–Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innova-
tion Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 399 (2008) (“[A] merger between the only two
(or two of a few) firms in R&D might increase the incentive to suppress at least
one of the research paths. With no other firms ready to enter the market, the
merging firms might not wish to introduce a second product that would reduce
sales of the first.”).
13. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the
Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 549 (2001).
14. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]ntitrust
jurisprudence has well understood that the enforcement of the antitrust laws is
self-defeating if it chills or stifles innovation.”).
15. See, e.g., Complaint to FTC at 3, In re NXP Semiconductors N.V., No. C-4560,
2015 WL 7843250 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2015) (“The Acquisition would eliminate the
direct competition between NXP and Freescale, which may lead to anticompeti-
tive unilateral effects in the form of higher prices and reduced innovation.”).
16. Complaint at 29, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 5:17-CV-00220, 2017 BL 219885
(N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) [hereinafter FTC Complaint]; see also infra section IV.B
(presenting a case study of Qualcomm).
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But on the other hand, some scholars and courts strenuously cau-
tion against using antitrust law to promote innovation. Part of their
apprehension concerns a reality of inventing: when a lack of competi-
tion harms innovation, the cause is oftentimes the patent system.17
Indeed, the patent system stimulates innovation by granting inven-
tors a limited right to charge monopoly prices and exclude competition
without incurring antitrust liability.18 So if antitrust law were to
make it harder to exclude competition and wield market power, then
the patent system could lose effectiveness.19 Firms might also invest
fewer resources in R&D if their exposure to antitrust liability were to
increase.20 And as a practical matter, the courts are probably ill-
equipped to fashion rules intended to incentivize technological ad-
vancement.21 To this camp, antitrust enforcement is likely to render
firms and markets less innovative.
Whether or not antitrust promotes innovation is a nuanced puzzle
that this Article explores. Although this topic has been called “[o]ne of
the most heated discussions in economic circles,”22 equally vexing le-
gal scholars, few, if any, statistical efforts have sought to determine
whether antitrust increases, decreases, or otherwise influences the
rate of innovation.23 Fortunately, antitrust is an ideal natural labora-
tory for empirical study; because antitrust’s intensity has fluctuated
by time and presidential Administration, it offers the types of statisti-
17. DESANTI ET AL., supra note 11, at 5.
18. Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the
Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 193 (1999) (“Courts and
academics alike considered intellectual property rights as exceptions to the anti-
trust law that must be narrowly construed.”).
19. See Bonny E. Sweeney, An Overview of Section 2 Enforcement and Developments,
2008 WIS. L. REV. 231, 258 (discussing the harm of § 2 enforcement on the incen-
tives to innovate).
20. See Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas De Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and
Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1510 (2009)
(stating that weak patent rights poorly protect innovation and thus poorly incen-
tivize innovation).
21. Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., Product Hopping and the Limits of Antitrust: The
Danger of Micromanaging Innovation, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST
CHRON., Dec. 2015, at 3–4 (explaining the courts are ill-equipped to determine
which types of innovation benefit or harm consumers).
22. Carrier, supra note 12, at 396; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition for In-
novation, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 799, 801–02 (describing the importance of
market structure and its effects on innovation and competition).
23. See Keith N. Hylton, A Unified Framework for Competition Policy and Innovation
Policy, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163, 166 (2014) (“Still, there has been little
effort to incorporate innovation concerns into models of antitrust enforcement.”);
Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Antitrust in Innovative Industries, 97 AM.
ECON. REV. 1703 (2007) (“Unfortunately, the effects of antitrust policy on innova-
tion are poorly understood.”).
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cal variations that tend to produce robust results.24 In turn, this Arti-
cle employs an original dataset, quantitative methods, and case
studies to examine the effects of antitrust’s numerous policy levers on
the rate of innovation in the United States. The statistical models ac-
count for, among other things, changes in private antitrust enforce-
ment, differences in merger and nonmerger actions, patent strength,
time, and societal variables such as education and wealth.
Of particular note, the research treatment inquires into whether
the FTC and DOJ’s decision to incorporate innovation within official
antitrust policy has benefited invention and scientific progress. The
pessimistic view is that the government tends to undermine innova-
tion by targeting anticompetitive behaviors in, specifically, dynamic
markets.25 After all, if firms perceive that an aggressive approach to
innovating is likely to draw unwanted attention from government reg-
ulators, then their motivation to invent new goods and methods could
wane. So even though the agencies have the expertise and resources to
stimulate innovation, their efforts might actually exacerbate the prob-
lem. This Article tests the effects of different types of government ac-
tions as well as changes in agency budgets and other proxies for
government antitrust intensity to determine whether the agencies’ ef-
forts have supported or impaired innovation.
In terms of contributions, the chief purpose of this Article is to pro-
vide a clearer picture of how antitrust law, the agencies, and enforce-
ment shape the incentives to innovate. The empirical results indicate
that antitrust enforcement has a powerful ability to promote innova-
tion sometimes. It also finds that certain qualities of antitrust enforce-
ment have so substantially raised the risk of liability in dynamic
markets that technological advancement has suffered. Supported by
behavioral-economics theory, it seems that the pervasive threat of an-
titrust litigation, although intended to stimulate competition and in-
novation, has caused inventors to become overly cautious and less
innovative. This Article concludes, based upon the empirical findings,
that innovation could flourish if inventors had immunity for acts com-
monly associated with developing, sharing, and marketing technol-
ogy—activities that actually do cultivate scientific progress. For
24. See generally William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Pol-
icy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 382–83 (2003) (discussing the
theory of how presidential Administrations have attempted to increase or de-
crease antitrust activity).
25. See Sweeney, supra note 19, at 258 (remarking that the agencies are concerned
that over enforcement of antitrust law in certain cases can discourage firms from
innovating); see also Alan Devlin, Antitrust As Regulation, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
823, 844 (2012) (“If competition rules force monopolists to license their physical
and intellectual infrastructure, or otherwise create conditions that are inimical to
high concentration and conducive to entry and rival expansion, the result may be
lower prices and higher output, but reduced rates of innovation.”).
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instance, inventors should have the freedom to improve their own
technology, collaborate with competitors, and license their patented
art without antitrust liability. These and other proposals are dis-
cussed in greater detail later. The hope is that the following research
is able to provide strategies to enhance the rate of innovation while
mitigating some of the costs and burdens of antitrust enforcement.
The statistical analysis also sheds light on an important yet sel-
dom-addressed legal issue. The courts are divided about whether indi-
viduals and corporations may fulfill antitrust’s injury requirement by
alleging harm to innovation.26 For example, some courts have ex-
pressly ruled that “a lack of innovation is not a cognizable antitrust
injury,” while others have remarked decreased innovation is one of
“the evils that antitrust laws are designed to prevent.”27 A few courts
have sought to reconcile these positions, suggesting conditions and sit-
uations in which diminished innovation may establish antitrust
standing.28 Given these inconsistent approaches, this Article proposes
a test, guided by the empirical results and conventional antitrust ju-
risprudence, to permit certain claims of reduced innovation to proceed.
This Article is organized into several Parts. Part II discusses anti-
trust’s unexpected relationship with patent law in historical and theo-
retical contexts. Part III traces the types of antitrust actions that the
FTC, DOJ, and private actors have asserted against defendants whose
conduct allegedly diminished the market’s incentives to innovate; this
discussion emphasizes the legal questions surrounding whether indi-
viduals and companies may initiate such a claim. Part IV investigates
this topic using case studies. The first two case studies illustrate the
ways that exclusionary conduct discourages invention and discovery,
while the third narrative presents the difficulties of predicting
whether antitrust enforcement is likely to provide a suitable remedy
or exacerbate the problem. Part V offers potentially the first quantita-
tive analysis of antitrust, patent law, and innovation. In Part VI, pol-
icy suggestions are offered based upon the theoretical and empirical
analyses found earlier. The Article then concludes with final thoughts.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANTITRUST–PATENT PARADOX
Traditionally, there was little expectation that antitrust law could
foster scientific progress. In fact, the patent system—which is the pri-
mary body of law meant to stimulate innovation—was thought to con-
26. See infra section III.C.
27. VBR Tours, LLC v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 14-CV-00804, 2015 WL
225328, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2015). But see Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112
F. Supp. 3d 529, 537 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (dismissing for the lack of an antitrust
injury despite the plaintiffs’ pleading harms to innovation); OverEnd Techs, LLC
v. Invista S.A.R.L., 431 F. Supp. 2d. 925, 930 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
28. See infra section III.C.
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flict with antitrust enforcement. This Part examines the unexpected
route that antitrust law took to become a stimulus of innovation and
its continuing tension with the patent system.
The perception that patent and antitrust laws are incompatible
has overshadowed their mutual ability to promote innovation. Known
as the “the patent–antitrust paradox,” it is said that antitrust’s pur-
pose is to prevent monopolies and other exclusionary practices,
whereas the patent system does the opposite, granting exclusionary
rights and market power in the form of patents.29 This view that pat-
ent and antitrust laws have irreconcilable goals dates back to, or
around, 1623 when the English Parliament enacted the Statute of Mo-
nopolies to rein in the King’s prerogative to grant patent monopo-
lies.30 Today, the United States is faithful to this approach,
characterizing each patent as a limited grant of antitrust immunity
which allows the patent holder to adopt exclusionary behaviors that
would otherwise violate antitrust law.31
However, a vibrant debate that began in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, and continues today, suggests that antitrust may have the ca-
pacity to foster innovation as a complement to the patent system. At
the core of this literature are seminal contributions by the economists
29. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing patents as an exception to antitrust law); see, e.g., Michael A. Carrier,
Unraveling the Patent–Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 762–63 (2002)
(explaining the conflicting nature of patent and antitrust laws); Erik Hovenkamp
& Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 871,
871–72 (2016) (discussing the “deliberate tradeoff” that patents present whereby
a patent pursues long-term economic growth via innovation, sacrificing short-
term efficiency by issuing monopoly rights and other exclusionary privileges).
30. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History,
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1271 (2001) (“Despite King James’ verbal
commitment to limitations on the royal power to grant monopolies, the de facto
abuse of the royal prerogative continued unabated. . . . The result was that Par-
liament passed the Statute of Monopolies in 1623 . . . .”); see John F. Duffy, In-
venting Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26–27
(2007) (noting the Statute of Monopolies’ importance in both antitrust and patent
law); Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the
Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 82–83 (1995).
31. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (“[A patent] provides an exception to antitrust law,
and the scope of the patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the patent—forms the
zone within which the patent holder may operate without facing antitrust liabil-
ity.”); King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 394
(3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) (“A patent . . . is an exception to
the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open
market.” (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 177 (1965)); FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1308–09 (11th
Cir. 2012)  (“[A] patent gives its holder a ‘bundle of rights,’ but any new exclusion-
ary rights the holder buys to add to that bundle do not fall within the scope of the
patent grant and [thus] do not fall within the scope of the patent’s antitrust
immunity.”).
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Joseph Schumpeter and Kenneth Arrow who debated whether mar-
kets animated by competition or monopoly power better incentivize
innovation.32
Schumpeter asserted that monopolies are more capable of generat-
ing innovation because monopolists have the resources to plan for the
future and hedge against failed efforts.33 Although Schumpeter
avoided the topic of patent rights, his research aligns with the modern
economic view of intellectual property (IP): without the monopoly
rights conferred by a patent, free riders could copy and sell another’s
invention without paying the transaction costs of developing the in-
vention, diminishing the incentives to innovate.34 It is only when a
zone of exclusivity is offered—i.e., patent rights—that actors are
likely to invent.35
Decades later, Kenneth Arrow rebuked Schumpeter’s position, ar-
guing that concentrated market power is more likely to frustrate in-
vention.36 He hypothesized that firms have less incentive to innovate
when their products face limited competition.37 To Arrow, firms are
only likely to invent when rivals threaten their market power with
more innovative, competitive goods.38 Arrow’s research has since per-
suaded notable scholars and policymakers that antitrust law is able to
foster innovation by unsettling monopolies and proscribing anticompe-
titive practices.39
To illustrate antitrust’s potential to promote innovation, consider a
corporate merger between the two dominant firms in a market: upon
the merger’s closing, the incentives to innovate may subside if the sur-
viving firm can no longer increase its market power by innovating new
32. Baker, supra note 9, at 577–79.
33. Carrier, supra note 12, at 403 (summarizing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, & DEMOCRACY 106 (1942)).
34. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1038 (1989) (“The thesis that
monopolies are conducive to innovation is generally associated with the work of
Joseph Schumpeter on economic development. While Schumpeter does not focus
exclusively on either technological innovations or the patent system, his analysis
suggests how patent monopolies might promote technological innovation.”); see
also Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent–Antitrust Paradox Through Tripar-
tite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2003) (discussing the motivation to
copy another’s invention in the absence of patent rights).
35. Carrier, supra note 34, at 1050.
36. Hubbard, supra note 10, at 2079.
37. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609 (1962); Baker, supra note 9, at 578 (“Arrow, a Nobel Prize-winning
economist . . . explained in 1962 that a monopolist might innovate less than com-
petitive firms because a monopolist has less to gain.”).
38. Hubbard, supra note 10, at 2079.
39. DESANTI ET AL., supra note 11, at 2 (describing the role of competition law in
promoting innovation).
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goods and methods.40 So by blocking the merger, an antitrust agency
could promote both competition and innovation. For example, in 2015,
Pfizer was in the process of developing an arthritis drug when it
sought to acquire Hospira which, at the time, owned the leading ar-
thritis drug on the market.41 Since the acquisition would give Pfizer
monopoly power in the arthritis drug market, the concern was that
Pfizer would curtail its efforts to develop a new drug.42 The European
Union Competition Committee (the EU’s antitrust agency) condi-
tioned its approval of the merger on Pfizer selling the rights to its pro-
spective arthritis drug to a competitor, thereby preserving competition
and innovation.43
To further harmonize antitrust and patent laws, the courts have
established the general rule that patentees enjoy a limited immunity
from antitrust law to act within the scope of their patent rights, but
even with this rule, it can still be difficult to determine whether an
exclusionary act exceeds one’s patent grant, thereby violating anti-
trust law. To those favoring strong patent rights, antitrust law should
take a laissez-faire approach to disputes involving innovation,
whereas antitrust’s proponents would more narrowly define patent
rights.44 Few cases better demonstrate the difficulties of establishing
where the boundaries between patent and antitrust laws lie than Ac-
40. Baker, supra note 9, at 592; see Carrier, supra note 12; supra text accompanying
note 12.
41. Justus Haucap & Joel Stiebale, Research: Innovation Suffers When Drug Compa-
nies Merge, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/research-in-
novation-suffers-when-drug-companies-merge [http://perma.unl.edu/C8SH-
59VS].
42. Margrethe Vestager, European Comm’r, Competition: The Mother of Invention
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/ves-
tager/announcements/competition-mother-invention_en [http://perma.unl.edu/
V3NQ-EXLP] (“Last year, we looked at a merger between the drug company Pfi-
zer and its rival, Hospira. We only approved the deal after Pfizer agreed to sell
the European rights to an arthritis drug it was developing. One concern was that
Hospira already had a competing drug on the market, and we thought Pfizer
might stop work on its own drug if the deal went ahead as planned. Which would
have meant less of the innovation that we depend on as patients. So protecting
innovation is important in our merger policy. So important, in fact, that we’re
considering whether to change our rules to do it more effectively.”).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement
as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1613 (2006) (“In ex-
change for receiving a reprieve from competition, the patentee must make a siza-
ble payment. This payment reduces its profits and hence the incremental
innovation incentive gained by arranging for the extension.”); Spencer Weber
Waller & Matthew Sag, Promoting Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2223, 2224
(2015) (“Modern businesses are well aware of the threat of disruptive outsiders
and, left unchecked, will do their utmost to prevent future waves of creative de-
struction from threatening the status quo.”).
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tavis v. FTC.45 In Actavis, a divided Supreme Court held that a phar-
maceutical company could potentially violate antitrust law by paying
a competitor to resist challenging the validity of one of its patents.46
The majority asserted that such a payment may exceed the company’s
patent rights because enforcing an invalid patent would give the com-
pany rights to which it was not entitled.47 But to the dissent, a pay-
ment to settle an infringement dispute falls squarely within the
inventor’s rights.48
In light of this tension, scholars have sought to determine the opti-
mal level of antitrust enforcement under which innovation is likely to
flourish.49 Despite the literature’s strong efforts—employing case
studies, formalized logic,50 and theoretical explorations—“the consen-
sus is that there is no clear answer.”51 Alan Devlin remarked, “Unfor-
tunately, the specific antitrust policies that best promote technological
advancement are far from clear,”52 and Marina Lao found that there
is “neither empirical nor clear theoretical support for the hypothesis
that monopolistic conditions, relative to competition, encourage more
innovation.”53 David McGowan summed up these efforts, stating that
“we may not be confident that antitrust suits enhance innovation, but
we cannot be confident that they retard it either.”54 The caveat is that
scholars do generally agree that innovation requires a mix of exclusion
and competition; although patent rights are an important condition of
innovation, fencing off too much competition appears to, as an exter-
nality, erode the incentives to innovate.55 But how much antitrust is
appropriate or effective remains a hotly contested debate.
45. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
46. Id. at 2237.
47. Id. at 2233.
48. Id. at 2239 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (“Thus, under our precedent, this is a fairly
straight-forward case. Solvay paid a competitor to respect its patent—conduct
which did not exceed the scope of its patent.”).
49. See Carrier, supra note 12 (using case studies to study this issue in the pharma-
ceutical industry); Shelanski, Competition Policy, supra note 3 (examining exclu-
sion and competition in industries involving the internet); Sweeney, supra note
19, at 258 (remarking that the agencies are concerned that over-enforcement of
antitrust law in certain cases can discourage firms from innovating).
50. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 23, at 167–71 (using game theory to assess the
debate).
51. Carrier, supra note 12, at 393.
52. Devlin, supra note 25, at 843; see Carrier, supra note 12.
53. Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 193 (2004).
54. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 733.
55. Hubbard, supra note 10, at 2079 (noting that exclusionary rights can have the
effect of discouraging further innovation); id. (“[W]hat’s the point of focusing on
making the product even better when the only company you can take business
from is yourself?” (quoting Steve Jobs) (citation omitted)); see also Carrier, supra
note 12, at 396 (discussing the factors producing the optimal level of competition
and exclusion, attempting to resolve the Arrow and Schumpeter debate).
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Having background on why antitrust is thought to cultivate inno-
vation and its points of tension with the patent system, the next Part
explores in greater detail how antitrust enforcement has been used for
this purpose.
III. THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES, ENFORCEMENT,
AND INNOVATION POLICY
This Part discusses the manner in which both the government and
private parties have sought to litigate reduced innovation under each
of the antitrust statutes: the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act),
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), and the Clayton Anti-
trust Act (Clayton Act). Although government efforts have tended to
follow a conventional path, there are salient, unaddressed questions
concerning whether, or in which situations, private parties may chal-
lenge this type of harm.
A. Merger Review and Enforcement
In 1992, the FTC and DOJ first suggested in a footnote of the agen-
cies’ joint merger guidelines that their authority to contest corporate
acquisitions could promote innovation.56 This assertion was made
pursuant to their authority under section 7 of the Clayton Act, which
provides the agencies may challenge business combinations that “sub-
stantially . . . lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.”57
Shortly thereafter, the agencies cited decreased innovation when
blocking several combinations, such as Medtronic’s merger with
Physio-Control.58 Then, in 2010, the agencies updated their merger
guidelines to formally incorporate innovation into the review pro-
cess.59 This directive announced the agencies would consider chal-
lenging acquisitions that “encourag[e] the merged firm to curtail its
innovative efforts below the level that would prevail in the absence of
56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, MERGER GUIDELINES 2 n.6 (1992).
57. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012); see, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp.
3d 100 (D.D.C. 2016).
58. Complaint at *2, In re Medtronic, Inc., No. C-3879, 1998 WL 918352 (F.T.C. Dec.
21, 1998) (claiming that Medtronic’s acquisition would so substantially eliminate
competition in the defibrillator market that prices were likely to increase and
innovation decline). The DOJ has initiated similar lawsuits. See, e.g., Complaint,
United States v. Echostar Commc’n Corp., No. 1:02CV02138 (D.D.C. Oct. 31,
2002); Complaint, United States v. Manitowoc Co., No. 02-0159, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25705 (D.D.C. July 31, 2002); United States v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., No.
3:95-CV-3055-P, 1996 WL 351145 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 1996); Complaint, In re
Aspen Technology, Inc., No. 9310, 2003 FTC LEXIS 178 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2003).
59. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
23 (2010).
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the merger.”60 Since these events, merger review has become the dom-
inant area of antitrust enforcement used to challenge conduct that
threatens to imperil innovation.
An example of the agencies’ concern for innovation is the DOJ’s
challenge of a proposed merger between two prominent suppliers of
semiconductors.61 In 2015, the shareholders and directors of Tokyo
Electron and Applied Materials approved a nine-billion-dollar merger,
prospectively naming the new corporation “Eteris.”62 Because the
merger was unlikely to alter products or prices, commentators as-
sumed the agencies would resist challenging the deal.63 The DOJ, in a
novel decision, contested the acquisition not because it harmed cur-
rent competition but because the acquisition threatened innovation,
describing it as “future competition.”64 Indeed, regulators feared that
eliminating a major competitor in the semiconductor market would re-
60. Id. at 23 (“The Agencies may consider whether a merger is likely to diminish
innovation competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative
efforts below the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger. That cur-
tailment of innovation could take the form of reduced incentive to continue with
an existing product-development effort or reduced incentive to initiate develop-
ment of new products.”).
61. Daisuke Wakabayashi et al., Applied Material to Acquire Tokyo Electron, WALL
STREET J. (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023037
59604579094770528224330 (observing that the new corporation would be valued
at twenty-nine billion dollars).
62. Don Clark, Applied Materials and Tokyo Electron Pick “Eteris” for Post-Merger
Name, WALL STREET J. (July 7, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/applied-
materials-and-tokyo-electron-pick-eteris-for-post-merger-name-1404781083.
63. Reuben Miller, Big Picture Issue, Strategic Missteps Doomed Merger for Applied
Materials and Tokyo Electron, FORBES (June 18, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/mergermarket/2015/06/18/big-picture-issue-strategic-missteps-doomed-
merger-for-applied-materials-and-tokyo-electron/#2e882db94db3 [http://perma
.unl.edu/UYZ7-MU9Z] (“Applied Materials and Tokyo Electron had guided inves-
tors towards smooth regulatory clearances and most merger-arbitrageurs saw lit-
tle reason to worry. Even when the process had aged beyond the normal shelf life
of a review, participants saw a deal that was all but done.”).
64. BERNARD A. NIGRO, JR. ET AL., FUTURE COMPETITION POSES PRESENT RISK TO
DEALS 1 (2015) (“Applied Materials, Inc. abandoned its 18-month pursuit of To-
kyo Electron Limited amid concerns by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and foreign antitrust regulators regarding potential harm to
future industry innovation.”); Andre Barlow, Mergers that Diminish Innovation
Present Deal Risk, ANTITRUST LAW. BLOG (May 7, 2015), https://www.anti-
trustlawyerblog.com/2015/05/mergers-that-raise-future-competition-concerns-
present-deal-risk [http://perma.unl.edu/RL3D-XUU7] (“The Antitrust Division’s
statement indicates that the transaction was blocked because the combination
would have diminished innovation. In other words, the Antitrust Division was
concerned about the potential loss of head to head competition in the develop-
ment of future cutting-edge semiconductor products and made no allegation that
the combined firm would have monopolized any existing or actual product mar-
ket. The Antitrust Division’s tough stance against AMAT indicates that it is will-
ing to scrutinize and challenge deals that raise longer-term anticompetitive
concerns related to future competition even if there is no past pricing evidence
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duce the surviving entities’ incentive to innovate.65 Applied Materials
and Tokyo Electron were unable to satisfy the DOJ after eighteen
months of trying, marking probably the first time that antitrust regu-
lators blocked a merger on almost exclusively innovation grounds.66
B. Nonmerger Antitrust Claims
The agencies would soon litigate reduced innovation in other areas
of antitrust law, including claims stemming from §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.67 Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes contracts and
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.68 Section 2 forbids us-
ing exclusionary means to “monopolize or attempt to monopolize . . .
any part of the trade or commerce.”69 Although the FTC does not en-
force the Sherman Act (the DOJ is the only antitrust regulator that
acts pursuant to the Sherman Act), section 5 of the FTC Act proscribes
“unfair methods of competition,” which encompasses the same harms
that may predict that the merger will result in higher prices regarding actual
products.”).
65. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Applied Materials Inc. and Tokyo Electron
Ltd. Abandon Merger Plans After Justice Department Rejected Their Proposed
Remedy (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/applied-materials-inc-
and-tokyo-electron-ltd-abandon-merger-plans-after-justice-department [http://
perma.unl.edu/X5TM-KEGV]; Brett Kendall & Don Clark, Applied Material, To-
kyo Electron Cancel Merger Plan, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/applied-materials-tokyo-electron-scrap-merger-plan-
1430117758?mg=id-wsj (stating that the acquisition could “eliminate important
head-to-head competition between two firms that have the skills and resources to
build machinery for companies that make cutting-edge computer chips,” stifling
future innovation).
66. Antitrust Concerns Thwart Tokyo Electron, Applied Materials Merger, NIKKEI
ASIAN REV. (Apr. 30, 2015), http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20150430-Vietnam-
s-new-chapter/Business/Antitrust-concerns-thwart-Tokyo-Electron-Applied-
Materials-merger [http://perma.unl.edu/L7FP-WAXP] (reviewing the companies’
decision to abandon the merger due to antitrust concerns).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
68. The statutory language states only that “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” § 1. Added
limitations that, for instance, the challenged conduct must have been “unreason-
able” is the product of judicial common law. Reg’l Multiple Listing Serv. of Minn.,
Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 958, 979 (D. Minn. 2013)
(“To establish a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act a plaintiff must demon-
strate (1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the
agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either a per se rule of illegality
or a rule of reason analysis . . . .”).
69. § 2; see, e.g., In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 133 (2d. Cir. 2014)
(“[An antitrust offense] requires, in addition to the possession of monopoly power
in the relevant market, the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident.” (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004))).
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banned by the Sherman Act.70 Consequently, the FTC has parallel au-
thority with the DOJ to investigate and remedy anticompetitive
behaviors.71
As for an earlier example of an antitrust lawsuit citing innovation
as the basis for challenging an exclusionary arrangement, in 1994, the
DOJ alleged that Pilkington PLC’s scheme to license its patented float
glass technology violated § 2.72 According to the government’s lawsuit,
Pilkington granted each of its licensees a geographical monopoly to
sell the company’s float glass—even after the technology’s patents had
expired—which discouraged the licensees from innovating their own
float glass systems, potentially in violation of an antitrust law.73 Soon
after, in 1995, the FTC and DOJ sought to increase attention given to
anticompetitive agreements involving IP, issuing guidelines about
when IP-related contracts may violate antitrust law.74 This policy was
reasserted in the agencies’ 2017 guidelines.75 Although antitrust au-
thorities have been slower to embrace innovation claims in nonmerger
lawsuits, the rate of filings has increased.76
70. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62
FLA. L. REV. 871, 873 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that the FTC’s
power to condemn ‘unfair methods of competition’ covers everything that the
Sherman Act covers and goes even further to reach a ‘penumbra’ of practices that
are not covered.”).
71. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Rocky Relationship Between the Federal Trade
Commission and Administrative Law, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2026, 2033–34
(2015) (discussing the agencies’ parallel jurisdictions).
72. Complaint at 4, United States v. Pilkington PLC, No. 94-345, 1994 WL 750645
(D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 1994); Anne K. Bingman, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Innovation and Antitrust Address (July 29, 1994) (stating that an ex-
press goal of filing suit against Pilkington was to stimulate innovation that was
being repressed by anticompetitive conduct).
73. Complaint at 9, Pilkington PLC, 1994 WL 750645; Keith Bradsher, U.S. Sues
British in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/
1994/05/27/business/us-sues-british-in-antitrust-case.html.
74. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10 (1995) (“If a licensing arrangement
may adversely affect competition to develop new or improved goods or processes,
the Agencies will analyze such an impact either as a separate competitive effect
in relevant goods or technology markets, or as a competitive effect in a separate
innovation market.”).
75. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2017) [hereinafter 2017 ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES].
76. See, e.g., FTC Complaint, supra note 16, at 29 (“Qualcomm’s anticompetitive
practices have . . . suppressed innovation.”); see also Complaint, United States v.
Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, No. 05C-5140, 242 F.R.D. 491 (2007); Complaint, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 2001 WL 34133964 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2001);
Complaint at 1, In re Transitions Optical, Inc., No. C-4289, 2010 WL 1804580
(F.T.C. Apr. 22, 2010) (“Transitions has improperly maintained its monopoly
power by engaging in exclusionary acts and practices, which include entering into
exclusive dealing arrangements that foreclose its rivals from key distributional
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C. Private Actors Enforcing Innovation
Following the DOJ and FTC’s lead, private actors have also sought
to litigate claims that a defendant’s exclusionary conduct diminished
innovation, though the legality of these suits is murky.77 The root of
the issue—which the literature has seldom addressed—concerns
whether a private party may satisfy the antitrust injury requirement
by alleging that the market has become less innovative.78
A private party can enforce the Sherman Act so long as the lawsuit
alleges a proper antitrust injury.79 Since antitrust law “protects com-
petition, not competitors,” the challenged act must have harmed the
market as opposed to the plaintiff who brought the case.80 Due to the
lack of guidance in the antitrust statutes about the types of injuries
proscribed by antitrust law, the courts have narrowed the universe of
harms down to only economic injuries.81 To show an act is anticompe-
titive, the courts tend to require evidence that it increased prices or
reduced output, though variation exists among the U.S. circuit
courts.82
channels. Transitions’ conduct has led to higher prices, lower output, reduced in-
novation and diminished consumer choice.”).
77. See, e.g., Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Tr. v. Trina Solar Ltd., No. 13-
13241, 2014 WL 5511517 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2014).
78. But see Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraint of Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 248,
258–59 (2007) (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s
treatment of innovation as an alleged antitrust injury).
79. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990).
80. Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n individual plain-
tiff personally aggrieved by an alleged anti-competitive agreement has not suf-
fered an antitrust injury unless the activity has a wider impact on the
competitive market.”); David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attor-
ney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244,
1246–47 (2012) (discussing the role of private citizens as “private attorney gener-
als” empowered to enforce the antitrust laws). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) (discussing the private attor-
ney general in antitrust litigation, enforcement, and policy).
81. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 2405–06 (stating that Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), evolved antitrust to ignore social and
political goals to concern itself with only economic goals).
82. See Procaps S.A. v. Patheon, Inc., 845 F.3d 1072, 1084 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Under
our precedent, ‘actual anticompetitive effects include, but are not limited to, re-
duction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality.’” (emphasis ad-
ded) (quoting Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir.
2010))). But see Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1096–97 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Anticom-
petitive effects, more commonly referred to as ‘injury to competition’ or ‘harm to
the competitive process,’ are usually measured by a reduction in output and an
increase in prices in the relevant market.”); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA,
961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The [Supreme Court’s] antitrust injury doc-
trine . . . requires every plaintiff to show that its loss comes from acts that reduce
output or raise prices to consumers.” (citations omitted)); JamSports & Entm’t,
LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“Judge
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In the context of innovation, several courts have dismissed such
lawsuits upon determining that innovation does not qualify as an an-
titrust injury.83 In VBR Tours, LLC v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.,84 the plaintiff alleged a predatory pricing scheme violated §§ 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act by “hampering its ability to innovate.”85 The
suit was rejected because, in the court’s view, “a lack of innovation is
not a cognizable antitrust injury.”86 Other courts have implicitly
reached this same conclusion: the Energy Conversion Devices Liqui-
dated Trust v. Trina Solar Ltd.87 court held that the lawsuit failed to
state an antitrust injury without addressing the plaintiff’s claim that
the defendant’s price-fixing scheme reduced innovation.88 By dis-
missing the lawsuit despite the allegations, the court implied that
plaintiffs must assert more than a lack of innovation to establish an
antitrust injury. In fact, the opinion in Fietelson v. Google Inc.89 re-
marked as much, stating that courts have implicitly rejected harm to
innovation as a standalone antitrust injury because the harm is likely
too speculative.90
To other courts, lost innovation is precisely why the antitrust laws
were enacted. The court in Free FreeHand Corp. v. Adobe Systems
Inc.91 referenced “decreasing innovation in the market,” among a se-
ries of anticompetitive allegations, as “the types of injuries that com-
monly satisfy the antitrust standing requirement.”92 Hear-Wear
Technologies, LLC v. Phonak, LLC93 came to the same conclusion,
holding that “blocking the introduction of innovation,” in addition to
other anticompetitive harms, “support[s] the existence of antitrust
injury.”94
Easterbrook’s consistent statements that antitrust injury is limited to decreased
output and increased prices finds support in the Supreme Court’s understanding
of why Congress created a private right to action in antitrust cases.”).
83. See, e.g., VBR Tours, LLC v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (VBR Tours II), No. 14-
cv-00804, 2015 WL 5693735 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2015).
84. VBR Tours, LLC v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (VBR Tours I), No. 14-cv-00804,
2015 WL 225328 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2015).
85. VBR Tours II, 2015 WL 5693735 at * 4.
86. VBR Tours I, 2015 WL 225328 at *5.
87. No. 13-13241, 2014 WL 5511517 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2014).
88. Id. at *3.
89. 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
90. Id. at 1027–29 (stating that other courts have implicitly rejected loss of innova-
tion as an antitrust injury, remarking that, in this instance, its harms are too
“conclusory and speculative”); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 259–60 (dis-
cussing how the speculative nature of innovation can frustrate private antitrust
jurisprudence from considering it as an antitrust injury).
91. 852 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
92. Id. at 1185.
93. No. 07-CV-0212-CVE-SAJ, 2008 WL 747086 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2008).
94. Id. at *7; see also OverEnd Tech. LLC v. Invista S.A`R.L., 431 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930
(E.D. Wis. 2006).
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Attempts have been made to reconcile these conflicting ap-
proaches. In Collegenet, Inc. v. Common Application, Inc.,95 the court
concluded it “does not find support for the proposition that an injury
solely based on less innovation . . . is sufficient to state a claim for
antitrust injury.”96 However, the opinion’s next statement insisted
that “[c]ertainly, decreased innovation . . . can be relevant to a court’s
finding of antitrust injury.”97 The court’s logic provides little guidance
though; it is difficult to determine how decreased innovation is “rele-
vant” when such a finding cannot support an action. If a court may
only rely upon decreased innovation when combined with a more
traditional antitrust harm, then the presence of decreased innovation
seems superfluous.
US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp.98 took a more logical ap-
proach. The ruling noted that a claim of reduced innovation might
show an antitrust injury if it constitutes, or leads to, a conventional
harm such as higher priced or reduced output: “A collective decision
among competitors to refuse a particular innovation could run afoul of
the antitrust laws, if a plaintiff were able to show that the collective
decision harmed competition, for example, by reducing output or re-
stricting prices.”99 But because the plaintiff failed to satisfy this bur-
den, the court denied standing.100 Dicta found in a footnote of United
States v. Visa101 arrived at a similar conclusion, suggesting that less
innovation could be characterized as an output reduction.102
In sum, antitrust law has increasingly been used to remedy inno-
vation injuries in both merger and nonmerger cases—though such at-
tempts by private parties have created judicial confusion. The belief is
that, because competition incentivizes innovation, antitrust’s ability
to promote competition should also preserve the incentives to inno-
vate. But how does this work in actuality? The case studies in the next
Part explore this question.
95. 104 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (D. Or. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 711 F. App’x 405 (9th
Cir. 2017).
96. Id. at 1149.
97. Id.
98. 105 F. Supp. 3d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal filed, No. 17-960 (2d Cir. Apr. 5,
2017).
99. Id. at 286.
100. Id. at 287 (“U.S. Airways has not argued that the refusal to implement Choice
Seats reduced or limited competition in any way.”).
101. 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
102. Id. at 406 n.28 (“The term ‘output reduction’ can mean a ‘marketwide decrease in
the number of units produced.’ But it can also refer to a decline in the quality of
the goods, or a decline in the rate of innovation that is committed to a particular
market.” (citation omitted)).
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IV. CASE STUDIES
Does the record support the agencies’ contention that antitrust en-
forcement enhances scientific progress? The first two case studies ex-
amine antitrust lawsuits intended to remedy diminished innovation:
in these narratives, a dominant firm used a merger or restraint of
trade, or both, to maintain market power, causing the market’s level
of innovation to diminish. However, the third example adds a nuance
to this narrative, explaining that, even if exclusionary behavior does
harm invention and discovery, it is difficult to determine whether an-
titrust enforcement is likely to promote innovation or compound the
problem.
A. Boston Scientific’s Merger and Consent Order
A notable example of the government using antitrust law to pro-
mote innovation occurred when the dominant firm in the catheter
market, Boston Scientific, acquired its primary competitor, Cardiovas-
cular Imaging Systems, Inc. (CVIS).103 When the merger was an-
nounced, the catheter market was experiencing years of rapid
technological advancement.104 As one court remarked, “Competition
between the two was intense, and the competition between the two
was a major catalyst for catheter innovation.”105 Their rivalry had
even spread to the courtroom in which each party had alleged the
other infringed upon their patent rights.106 So from the perspective of
Boston Scientific, the acquisition made sense; it would allow Boston
Scientific to capture CVIS’s patent portfolio, quelling their intense
competition and R&D arms race.107
The FTC challenged the merger since eliminating one of the two
major competitors in the catheter market—together they controlled
ninety percent of the market—was likely to undermine the industry’s
rate of innovation.108 According to the agencies’ theory of market com-
103. United States v. Bos. Sci. Corp. (Boston Scientific V), 253 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.
Mass. 2003).
104. Id. at 89 (“In a game of one down-manship, each competed to create smaller and
smaller diameter catheters.”).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (“The jewel of the prospective merger, however, was CVIS. BSC wanted to
obtain CVIS’ intellectual property; at the time, [Boston Scientific] and CVIS were
engaged in a patent infringement action over the IVUS technology. Competition
between the two was intense, and the competition was a major catalyst for cathe-
ter innovation.”).
108. Id. at 90–91; In re Bos. Sci. Corp. (Boston Scientific I), No. 951-0002, 1995 WL
87948, at *20 (F.T.C. Feb. 1995) (“The effect of these acquisitions, the complaint
alleges, is likely to be higher prices for IVUS catheters and diminished product
innovation.”); see also Boston Scientific V, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 99 (“[T]he elimina-
tion of competition immediately after HP left the marketplace led to a decline in
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petition, the surviving firm would have little reason to develop prod-
ucts that would ultimately compete against the catheter technology it
had just acquired.109 Due to these concerns, the FTC demanded that
Boston Scientific enter into a consent order as a condition of the acqui-
sition’s closing, allowing the firms to merge so long as Boston Scien-
tific licensed certain patents on a perpetual and royalty-free basis to
Hewlett-Packard (HP).110 By licensing patents to HP, the FTC ex-
pected competition between Boston Scientific and HP to maintain the
industry’s low prices and robust innovation.111
The Boston Scientific case was, however, far from over. Shortly af-
ter the FTC permitted the merger to proceed, the FTC and HP alleged
(in separate antitrust actions) that Boston Scientific breached the con-
sent order by refusing to license certain patents to HP, forcing HP out
of the catheter market.112 For instance, HP sold an automatic pull-
back device that incorporated patents enumerated in the consent or-
der; nonetheless, Boston Scientific threatened HP—and HP’s
customers—with infringement lawsuits if they continued to use HP’s
device, causing HP’s sales to plummet.113 Boston Scientific’s tactics,
according to HP, violated the Sherman Act’s prohibition of attempting
to monopolize the market.114 The court agreed, denying Boston Scien-
catheter innovation, and resulting harm to the public. As Dr. Schumann (the
FTC’s expert) testified, the lack of competition eliminated BSC’s incentive to in-
vest in research and development in catheter innovation. The introduction of new
and improved coronary and peripheral catheters sharply declined following
BSC’s acquisition of CVIS in 1995, and further diminished after HP exited from
the market at the end of 1998.”).
109. See In re Bos. Sci. Corp. (Boston Scientific II), 119 F.T.C. 549, 553 (1995) (“It will
likely result in diminished product innovation in IVUS catheters . . . .”).
110. Boston Scientific I, 1995 WL 87948, at *3 (providing the terms of the consent
order, which includes: “Respondent shall, absolutely and in good faith, grant pur-
suant to [the agreement], at no minimum price and with no continuing royalties,
a perpetual, non-exclusive license to IVUS Technology Portfolio, together with
the right to grant exclusive sub-licenses to any part of such IVUS Technology
Portfolio . . . .”).
111. Id. (“The purpose of the license is to create an independent competitor in the
development, production and sale of IVUS Catheters and to remedy the lessening
of competition resulting from the CVIS Acquisition . . . .”); see also United States
v. Bos. Sci. Corp. (Boston Scientific IV), 167 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (D. Mass. 2001).
112. Boston Scientific IV, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (“The government claims that [Bos-
ton Scientific] violated the FTC’s order by failing to license the Webler patent to
HP.”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bos. Sci. Corp. (Boston Scientific III), 77 F. Supp.
2d 189, 194 (D. Mass. 1999).
113. Boston Scientific III, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (“BSC claimed that HP was not au-
thorized to use the pullback patent and threatened to sue HP for patent infringe-
ment. BSC also told customers that HP’s pullback device infringed on a BSC
patent and threatened to sue customers who continued to use the HP automatic
pullback device.”).
114. See, e.g., id. (“HP designed and developed a new catheter called ‘Scout’ and pro-
vided its technical specifications to BSC so that BSC could ensure that the cathe-
ter would operate with BSC consoles. BSC did not create the requested interface.
2018] INNOVATIVE ANTITRUST 849
tific’s motion to dismiss and remarking that Boston Scientific “injured
the competitive process by engaging in predatory acts which drove HP
out of the market . . . , depriving consumers of a meaningful choice of
competing innovative products.”115
By failing to comply with the consent order, the Boston Scien-
tific–CVIS merger produced an extraordinary result. Typically, when
the FTC or DOJ blocks a merger, it is difficult to determine whether
the combination would have reduced innovation. After all, assessing
whether a merger is likely to generate a negative effect requires a
counterfactual scenario that rarely occurs. Here, as a consequence of
breaching the consent order, the precise anticompetitive and anti-in-
novative results feared by the FTC had an opportunity to take place,
which they did. Following the acquisition, Boston Scientific slashed its
R&D budget, spending less on innovation from 1999 to 2001 than it
did in 1998 alone.116 One court remarked that as a result of the
merger and exclusionary behaviors, Boston Scientific halted develop-
ment of its $4.1 million “Cadillac” catheter, which was meant to com-
pete against HP’s device.117 Without HP, Boston Scientific had little
reason to invest in such a capital-intensive project, stunting industry
innovation.118 Although HP and Boston Scientific negotiated a settle-
ment,119 the court presiding over the FTC action ordered Boston Sci-
entific to pay a seven-million-dollar penalty, ruling that Boston
Scientific’s conduct reduced competition and innovation.120
In sum, Boston Scientific illustrates how anticompetitive conduct
reduces innovation: after Boston Scientific merged with its primary
competitor, the company used exclusionary means to further preserve
its market power. As a result, Boston Scientific and its competitors
curtailed their R&D efforts, causing the overall market to become less
innovative. The next case presents similar issues.
HP alleges that by not making a meaningful effort to do so, BSC sought to make
the catheter commercially unsuccessful in furtherance of BSC’s objective to mo-
nopolize the catheter and console markets. HP claims this refusal violated BSC’s
obligation [under the consent order].”).
115. Id.; see also United States v. Bos. Sci. Corp. (Boston Scientific V), 253 F. Supp. 2d
85, 99 (D. Mass. 2003) (“[T]he elimination of competition immediately after HP
left the marketplace led to a decline in catheter innovation . . . [and] eliminated
BSC’s incentive to invest in research and development.”).
116. Boston Scientific V, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
117. Id. (“BSC cancelled the $4.1 million ‘Cadillac’ project to design a new 3.5 French
catheter—which was intended to stave off competition from [HP’s] Scout—after
HP decided to leave the market. No new catheters were introduced in 1999, after
HP’s exit, and only 1 new catheter was introduced in each of 2000 and 2001.”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 99; United States v. Bos. Sci. Corp. (Boston Scientific IV), 167 F. Supp. 2d
424, 426 (D. Mass. 2001).
120. Boston Scientific V, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 102.
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B. Qualcomm’s Attempt to Dominate the Market for
Cellphones and Cellphone Innovation
Qualcomm has endured over a decade’s worth of allegations that
its exclusionary tactics harm consumers and markets. In 2005,
Broadcom Corporation (Broadcom) filed the initial antitrust lawsuit
against Qualcomm, which the FTC and Apple followed with similar
actions.121 Each of the lawsuits claimed that Qualcomm abused its
position as the owner of standard-setting technology in the cellphone
industry to suppress innovation.122
Cellphones are comprised of numerous components made by a vari-
ety of companies.123 For cellphones to operate properly, their parts
must be compatible.124 Standards-setting organizations (SSOs) ac-
complish this feat by establishing industry standards intended to coor-
dinate manufacturers and products.125 Oftentimes SSOs create
standards that incorporate technologies developed and owned by pri-
vate parties. If a selected technology is patented, then its owner could,
without restrictions, demand supra-competitive prices; after all, com-
petitors must license it.126 To mitigate this problem, SSOs require
patent owners as a condition of incorporation to license the relevant
patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND)
terms.127
According to Broadcom’s complaint, Qualcomm induced the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to adopt its
chipsets by promising to license the relevant patents on FRAND
121. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 05-3350 (MLC), 2006 WL 2528545 (D.N.J.
Aug. 31, 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir.
2007).
122. Susan Decker et al., Apple Sues Qualcomm over Patent Royalties in Antitrust
Case, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2017-01-20/apple-sues-qualcomm-over-patent-royalties-in-antitrust-case
[http://perma.unl.edu/WE9U-73CW].
123. Broadcom, 2006 WL 2528545, at *1.
124. Id. (“Various companies manufacture such chipsets, and the phones into which
they are incorporated. To function properly, however, cell phones and chipsets
made by different manufacturers must be capable of interfacing with each other.
To ensure the interoperability of different cell phones, the wireless industry
works with several standards development organizations (‘SDOs’) to develop
wireless communication standards.” (citations omitted)).
125. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organi-
zations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1891–92 (2002) (discussing standard-setting orga-
nizations and their effects on promoting innovation).
126. See Broadcom, 2006 WL 2528545, at *1.
127. Id. (“An SDO may require a patent-holder to agree to license the patent on fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms before it agrees to incorpo-
rate the patent into the standard. This requirement is designed to prevent a pat-
ent-holder from acquiring an unfair advantage when a patent is incorporated into
the standard.”).
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terms, though Qualcomm allegedly had no intention of doing so.128
Instead, Qualcomm demanded exorbitant prices reflecting the market
power that ETSI had just granted it, absconding from its promise to
charge “fair” royalty rates.129
Broadcom also claimed that Qualcomm licensed SSO technology on
a discriminatory basis: Qualcomm purportedly offered cheaper rates
to consumers who licensed its non-SSO products, disfavoring those
who patronized its competitors.130 Qualcomm’s tactic, the complaint
asserted, eroded competition and innovation since competitors had lit-
tle incentive to develop technology that consumers were unlikely to
purchase, abrogating its FRAND commitments.131 It was said:
Qualcomm . . . has a 90% share in the market for CDMA-path chipsets, and by
withholding favorable pricing in that market, coerced cellular telephone man-
ufacturers to purchase only Qualcomm-manufactured UMTS-path chipsets.
These actions are alleged to be part of Qualcomm’s effort to obtain a monopoly
in the UMTS chipset market because it views competition in that market as a
long-term threat to its existing monopolies in CDMA technology.132
As a result, Qualcomm may have violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act by using its market power to unreasonably exclude competition
and preserve its dominant position.133
After the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey initially
dismissed the complaint for a failure to state a claim, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held in favor of Broadcom.134 In overrul-
ing the district court, the Third Circuit asserted that acquiring mo-
128. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 304 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The Com-
plaint alleged that Qualcomm induced the ETSI and other SDOs to include its
proprietary technology in the UMTS standard by falsely agreeing to abide by the
SDO’s policies . . . but then breached those agreements by licensing its technology
on non-FRAND terms.”).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 318.
131. FTC Complaint, supra note 16, at 20 (“[R]educed sales and margins resulting
from Qualcomm’s tax diminish[ed] competitors’ abilities and incentives to invest
and innovate.”).
132. Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 304; id. at 318 (“These actions, the Complaint concluded,
harmed competition and undermined innovation in the UMTS chipset market.
Such factual allegations of anticompetitive conduct are sufficiently specific to sat-
isfy the first element of an attempted monopolization claim.” (citation omitted)).
133. Id. at 304 (“The intentional acquisition of monopoly power through deception of
an SDO, Broadcom posits, violates antitrust law.”); id. at 318 (“Qualcomm was
charging double royalties to UMTS cell phone manufacturers who use non-
Qualcomm UMTS chipsets. . . . Qualcomm was also providing discounts, incen-
tives, and payments to cell phone manufacturers who use only Qualcomm UMTS
chipsets.” (citation omitted)).
134. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 05-3350 (MLC), 2006 WL 2528545, at *6
(D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2006) (ruling that Qualcomm’s attempted monopolization of the
market was based upon utilizing the company’s patent rights which constitutes a
legalized monopoly, and therefore, Qualcomm’s behavior could not violate the an-
titrust laws), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir.
2007).
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nopoly power by deception of an SSO could run afoul of the Sherman
Act.135 The court determined that Qualcomm gained an unfair ability
to charge prices in excess of what its patents would have ordinarily
garnered.136 This lawsuit culminated in an $891 million settlement in
Broadcom’s favor.137
Similar to Boston Scientific, the matter was far from over. In Janu-
ary of 2017, the FTC brought an antitrust lawsuit claiming that
Qualcomm was continuing to violate its FRAND commitments.138
Three days later, Apple initiated a similar action to Broadcom’s and
the FTC’s lawsuits.139 The gravamen of Apple’s complaint was that
Qualcomm violated the Sherman Act by charging royalty rates based
upon the value of technology developed and owned by others.140 For
example, if Apple created groundbreaking technology that increased
the demand for, and price of, the iPhone, Qualcomm—by virtue of
owning standard-setting technology used in the iPhone—would raise
its own royalty rates to reflect Apple’s innovation.141 Thus, Qualcomm
was misusing its position as a standard setter to “tax” the innovation
of others.142 The effect of which, Apple concluded, generated supra-
competitive profits for Qualcomm and suppressed innovation in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.143
135. Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 317–19.
136. Id. at 313 (“Misrepresentation concerning the costs of implementing a given tech-
nology may confer an unfair advantage and bias the competitive process in favor
of that technology’s inclusion in the standard. . . . Although a patent confers a
lawful monopoly over the claimed invention, its value is limited when alternative
technologies exist. That value becomes significantly enhanced, however, after the
patent is incorporated in a standard.” (citation omitted)).
137. Brooke Crothers, Qualcomm, Broadcom Reach $891 Million Settlement, CNET
(Apr. 27, 2009), https://www.cnet.com/news/qualcomm-broadcom-reach-891-mil-
lion-settlement [http://perma.unl.edu/9MAM-E83T].
138. Brett Kendall, Federal Trade Commission Files Antitrust Lawsuit Against
Qualcomm, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-
trade-commission-files-antitrust-lawsuit-against-qualcomm-1484689732.
139. Redacted Complaint at 56, Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17CV0108 GPC
NLS, 2017 WL 3966944 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2017).
140. Id. at 1–2 (“What this means in the case of the iPhone is that when Apple engi-
neers create a revolutionary new security feature such as touch ID, which en-
ables breakthrough technologies like Apple Pay, Qualcomm insists on royalties
for these and other innovations it had nothing to do with and royalty payments go
up. When Apple spends billions redefining the concept for a smartphone camera,
Qualcomm’s royalty payments go up.”).
141. Id. at 2–3.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 92–93 (“The anticompetitive effects of Qualcomm’s conduct include the ele-
vation of CDMA and premium LTE chipset prices above competitive levels, the
imposition on Apple of onerous, unreasonable, and costly supply terms, the sup-
pression of innovation in the chipset market, and the elimination of Apple’s abil-
ity to choose its suppliers of chipsets in a competitive market.”).
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Some parties though were not as convinced that Qualcomm should
incur antitrust liability. In January 2017, FTC Commissioner Mau-
reen Ohlhausen dissented from the FTC’s complaint, stating that the
alleged harms and damages were too speculative.144 Of note, the dis-
sent remarked that the FTC’s case is “based on a flawed legal the-
ory . . . that lacks economic and evidentiary support.”145
Commissioner Ohlhausen is not necessarily incorrect: there is a lack
of support. Not only has the FTC’s complaint omitted empirical evi-
dence that Qualcomm’s conduct harmed competition or innovation,
but there is almost no evidence—on a general level—that anticompeti-
tive conduct stifles innovation or that antitrust laws are capable of
remedying this injury. Indeed, Commissioner Ohlhausen’s position
was that the allegations are unsupported by the empirical record. The
next case study and Part V’s empirical analysis address Commis-
sioner’s Ohlausen’s concern.
C. The Dilemma of Creating Antitrust Liability in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
This case study adds complexity to the above narrative by illustrat-
ing the difficulties of determining whether antitrust enforcement is
likely to enhance or imperil an industry’s rate of innovation—even if
anticompetitive conduct can be established. Prior to the
Hatch–Waxman Act,146 two problems beleaguered the drug market.
First, a brand-name company (brand company or brand) that sought
to introduce a new drug, known as a “pioneer drug,” was required by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to evaluate the drug’s safety
and effectiveness in a lengthy testing process known as the New Drug
Application (NDA).147 Because this phase typically began after a
brand company received patent rights to a drug, the brands tended to
have less than their patent’s twenty-year term to market a pioneer
drug, abridging their patent rights and incentives to innovate.148 Sec-
ond, since the FDA subjected generic drugs to the same NDA process
as the brands, the generic companies could only avoid infringing upon
the brand’s patent rights by beginning the lengthy review process af-
144. MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MAUREEN K.
OHLHAUSEN IN THE MATTER OF QUALCOMM, INC. 1 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/pub-
lic-statements/2017/01/dissenting-statement-commissioner-maureen-k-ohlhau
sen-matter-qualcomm-inc [https://perma.unl.edu/6SBY-VYBK].
145. Id.
146. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1606 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
147. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Pre-
sumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 43 (2009) (explaining that the costs of
testing a drug’s effectiveness and safety encroached into a drug’s patent term
which had the result of diminishing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry).
148. Id.
854 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:829
ter the relevant patents had expired. As a result of delaying generics
from the market, the brands were able to charge monopoly prices for
years after their exclusive rights had lapsed, propping up drug
prices.149
The Hatch–Waxman Act sought to ease these burdens by estab-
lishing a more competitive and innovative regulatory system.150 As a
first step, it created a route for brands to extend their patent rights up
to five years beyond a patent’s standard twenty-year term to compen-
sate for the time lost during the testing process.151 The second mecha-
nism lessened the cost and time of introducing a generic drug into the
market.152 Congress instituted the Abbreviated New Drug Applica-
tion (ANDA), which allows a generic company to adopt the brand com-
pany’s safety and effectiveness tests so long as the pioneer and generic
drugs are bioequivalents and contain the same active ingredient.153
Once a generic drug gains regulatory approval using the ANDA pro-
cess, “switching laws” allow pharmacists to swap out the pioneer drug
for its generic equivalent, increasing competition and lowering
prices.154 So by elongating the brand’s patent rights while also reduc-
149. Id. at 42–43 (explaining that prior to the Hatch–Waxman Act, the research and
development of patent drugs during the patent’s effective term was considered an
infringing use).
150. Warner–Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The
purpose of Title I of the Bill is to make available more low cost generic drugs . . . .
The purpose of Title II of the Bill is to create a new incentive for increased ex-
penditures for research and development of certain products which are subject to
premarket government approval.” (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
98–857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48)).
151. Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(“Section 201 of the Hatch-Waxman Act provided for an extension of patents for
certain drugs for up to five years to address the problem of the distorted patent
term on the front end.”), aff’d, 324 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
152. Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 173 (2016) (“The drafters of the Act sought to ensure
the provision of ‘low-cost, generic drugs for millions of Americans’ and recognized
that generic competition would save consumers, as well as the federal govern-
ment, millions of dollars each year.” (citation omitted)).
153. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (“[T]he rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not
show a significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed
drug when administered at the same molar dose . . . under similar experimental
conditions . . . .”); see also Schering Corp. v. FDA, 866 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D.N.J.
1994) (“Prior to 1984, manufacturers desiring to sell generic copies of drugs ap-
proved after 1962 were required to submit full new drug applications. This in-
volved a time consuming and expensive process which included comprehensive
animal and human testing to show that the new drug is safe and effective. The
1984 Amendments free the manufacturer or distributor of a generic drug product
from the clinical trial requirements as long as it could prove that the generic is
bioequivalent to the already-approved pioneer drug it copies.”), aff’d, 51 F.3d 390
(3d Cir. 1995).
154. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 428 (3d Cir.
2016) (“Every state in the United States has drug substitution laws. These state
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ing the costs of gaining approval for a generic, the Hatch–Waxman Act
balanced incentivizing innovation and promoting competition.155
The brand companies, however, found ways to subvert the ANDA
process. Right before a brand drug’s patent expires, the brand paten-
tee may manipulate trivial qualities of the drug to eliminate bioe-
quivalence with its generic counterpart before the generic drug
reaches the market.156 As examples, a brand may turn a pill into a gel
cap or change its dosage from once daily to twice. This strategy,
known as “product hopping,” is often accompanied by a “hard switch”
whereby the brand company pulls the older version from the market,
leaving only the new drug.157 The results of a product hop and hard
switch (1) prevent pharmacists from swapping out the pioneer drug
for its generic version and (2) block generic companies from adopting
the brand patentee’s safety and effectiveness tests, which raise the
costs of developing a generic drug as well as extend the brand compa-
nies’ market power.158 Plaintiffs filed suits, alleging that a minor in-
novation meant only to perpetuate the patentee’s market power
violates the Sherman Act’s ban against monopolizing the market.159
Interestingly, there are conflicting theories about whether expos-
ing brand patentees to antitrust liability is likely to increase or de-
crease innovation. The case in favor of scrutinizing product hops was
outlined in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC.160 In that
dispute, it was alleged that Actavis PLC violated the Sherman Act by
slightly modifying its Alzheimer’s drug Namenda IR, creating
Namenda XR, shortly before IR’s patent expired.161 With generic ver-
sions of IR set to become available, Actavis enticed doctors, patients,
and pharmacists to switch from IR to XR by reducing XR’s price, offer-
substitution laws ‘either permit or require pharmacists to dispense a therapeuti-
cally equivalent, lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand drug absent express
direction from the prescribing physician that the prescription must be dispensed
as written.’” (quoting N.Y. ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638,
645 (2d Cir. 2015))).
155. Warner–Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1358.
156. Mylan Pharm., 838 F.3d at 426.
157. 21 C.F.R. § 314.127 (as amended 2016); see also Jacob S. Sherkow, Adminis-
trating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 234 (2015) (discussing the
Hatch–Waxman Act’s requirement that the FDA deny a generic’s ANDA after the
brand company’s product hop).
158. See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., No. 15-CV-12730-DJC, 2016 WL 4083333 (D.
Mass. July 20, 2016) (“Product hopping is the practice of tweaking a brand-name
drug to prevent pharmacists from substituting a generic equivalent when
presented with a prescription for the newly modified brand-name drug.”).
159. See, e.g., Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v. Acta Vis, PLC,
No. 15-CV-6549 (CM), 2016 WL 4992690, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2016) (alleging
that the defendant’s product hop violated the Sherman Act).
160. 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
161. Id. at 647.
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ing rebates, and ultimately discontinuing IR.162 The hard switch com-
pelled pharmacists to prescribe XR instead of generic Namenda
because the generic companies had sought to develop bioequivalence
with IR, not XR.163 For a generic company to compete against
Namenda, it would have to wait until XR’s patent expires in 2029 or
undergo the lengthy NDA process to introduce a new drug, undermin-
ing the statutory benefits sought by the Hatch–Waxman Act.164 The
Attorney General of New York initiated an antitrust action, claiming
that Actavis’s product hop and hard switch violated § 1 of the Sher-
man Act.
The Schneiderman court ruled that, although innovation typically
benefits consumers, here, antitrust liability is appropriate. According
to the court, product hopping not only limits competition, but it also
“may deter significant innovation by encouraging manufacturers to fo-
cus on switching the market to trivial or minor product reformulations
rather than investing in the research and development necessary to
develop riskier, but medically significant innovations.”165 With this
observation, the court held that obstructing generic competition in the
process of extending one’s patent rights may monopolize the market in
violation of the Sherman Act. This language was supported by In re
Asacol Antitrust Litigation,166 which found that superfluous innova-
tions can be considered anticompetitive.167
On the other hand, some courts and scholars have persuasively ar-
gued that subjecting product hops to antitrust liability is likely to re-
duce innovation. For example, the court in Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public Ltd. Co.168 held that Warner Chilcott’s
product hop did not transgress antitrust law—even though the case
was similar to Schneiderman and Asacol—opining that “[t]he prospect
of costly and uncertain litigation every time a company reformulates a
brand-name drug would likely increase costs and discourage manufac-
turers from seeking to improve existing drugs.”169 Likewise, an article
coauthored by Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia noted that seemingly insignificant im-
provements can greatly enhance consumer welfare.170 And because
courts are improper forums to evaluate the relative merits of product
innovations, they argued that exposing pharmaceutical companies to
162. Id. at 648.
163. Id. at 647.
164. Id. at 642.
165. Id. at 659.
166. No. 15-CV-12730-DJC, 2016 WL 4083333 (D. Mass. July 20, 2016).
167. Id. at *9.
168. No. 12–3824, 2015 WL 1736957, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), aff’d, 838 F.3d
421 (3d Cir. 2016).
169. Id.
170. Ginsberg et al., supra note 21.
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liability for improving drug formulas “risks chilling future innovation
that could yield significant consumer benefits.”171
Given the uncertainty effects that antitrust law renders on innova-
tion, the question of whether enforcement should target innovative
markets supports Commissioner Olhaussen’s statement that the issue
requires further study. The next Part answers the first set of ques-
tions with statistical analyses.
V. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST’S
INFLUENCE ON INNOVATION
Using a new dataset and quantitative methods, this Part examines
whether antitrust law promotes innovation. Helping matters, the his-
tory of antitrust is an ideal natural laboratory for empirical study. The
rate of antitrust enforcement has fluctuated over time, creating the
types of variations that generate strong statistical results.172 For ex-
ample, the number of cases initiated by private parties steadily in-
creased in the early 1980s at which point the aforementioned
antitrust revolution generally reduced the number of private cases,
spiking again during the height of the Great Recession in
2006–2008.173 As for actions initiated by the government, since the
1960s, antitrust has generally escalated; however, there are times
when it has decreased, especially during the tenure of President Ron-
ald Reagan.174 It then reemerged in subsequent Administrations.175
As a result of antitrust’s varying intensity over the years, it can be
statistically determined with a high level of confidence whether the
rate of innovation has changed in accordance with increases and de-
creases of antitrust activity, controlling for other mitigating factors.
171. Id. at 4; see id. at 1 (“Competition law is not a suitable instrument for
micromanaging product design and innovation . . . .”).
172. Variation is essential for statistical studies. If a variable never fluctuates, it, in
fact, fails to meet the definition of a variable. It can be more difficult to assess a
variable that varies in a steady and consistent manner because its trajectory
could actually be determined by other variables that are changing in the same
manner. A more ideal variable is one that sporadically increases or decreases;
this is because any measured effects are easier to attribute to that variable, pro-
ducing more reliable results. See generally Sanford M. Litvack, The Ebb and Flow
of Antitrust Enforcement: The Reagan and Carter Administrations, 1982 BYU L.
REV. 849, 850–51 (1982).
173. Paul E. Godek, Does the Tail Wag the Dog? Sixty Years of Government and Pri-
vate Antitrust in the Federal Courts, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2009, at 2 tbl.2.
174. Eddie Correia, The Reagan Assault on Antitrust, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Feb.
15, 1986), http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1986/0215/correia
.html [http://perma.unl.edu/W8FP-7EYD]; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Reagan’s Anti-
trust Explosion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/10/
business/reagan-s-antitrust-explosion.html.
175. See, e.g., David A. Balto, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 65 (1999) (observing an increase in antitrust en-
forcement during the Clinton administration).
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Figure 1 demonstrates the varying rate of private antitrust inten-
sity, illustrated by the number of cases filed each year in the federal
courts. Figure 2 graphs the fluctuations of government antitrust in-
tensity using an alternative measure of agency budgets in current
dollars.
Figure 1: Private Antitrust Actions Filed by Year
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Creating even more variation, each type of antitrust action initi-
ated by the government has fluctuated in a unique pattern from the
other types. So while the rate of § 1 investigations has steadily de-
clined until present day, merger enforcement—which has tradition-
ally been less common than §§ 1 and 2 investigations—peaked in the
1990s and has since become more prominent than Sherman Act inves-
tigations. This variation provides important clues about the effects of
each type of antitrust enforcement; if they had all varied in the same
way, then it would be difficult to detect each action’s independent in-
fluence on innovation. See Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Government Antitrust Actions Filed by Year
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A. Hypotheses
The expected findings—i.e., this study’s hypotheses—are generally
optimistic about antitrust’s efficacy. Greater levels of antitrust en-
forcement are hypothesized to foster the competitive forces needed to
stimulate innovation, so when antitrust intensity is greater (as de-
picted by higher levels of antitrust investigations, lawsuits, budgets,
and personnel), society should produce more innovation. This is ex-
pected to be true and consistent throughout the course of modern
American history. That said, antitrust enforcement has likely incen-
tivized more R&D and other creative activities since becoming a part
of governmental policy. Indeed, because the antitrust agencies are
now selecting cases for enforcement based upon perceived harm to in-
novation,176 antitrust’s pursuit of innovation is likely to be more fruit-
ful. Another hypothesis asserts that the type of antitrust enforcement
producing the most innovation is merger review. This is because busi-
ness combinations that overly concentrate market power can shift the
R&D incentives of entire industries, whereas exclusionary conduct ac-
tions are more likely to affect discrete actors, rendering fewer sys-
temic effects.177 Remedying anticompetitive mergers may therefore
generate more innovation than nonmerger violations.
176. See, e.g., Vestager, supra note 42 (including a statement by the European Anti-
trust Commission asserting that promoting innovation is a consideration in how
antitrust law is initiated).
177. The goal of merger review is essentially to determine whether the combination
would result in a monopoly, which would typically influence the entire market
affected by the merger. While conduct cases require a level of market power, they
do not necessarily have to rise to the level of market monopolization.
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B. Research Design
This study uses a new dataset comprised of publicly available data
as well as data received from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) re-
quests. The dataset spans from 1963 to 2015 with one unique entry
per year. In essence, it demonstrates the effects of higher and lower
levels of antitrust enforcement and intensity on society’s ability to pro-
duce patents and other innovative activities, such as R&D.178
1. Variables
The primary dependent variable is patent issuances. A dependent
variable is the entity that the research intends to explain; in this case,
the study analyzes how certain factors drive the U.S. level of innova-
tion, leading to patent issuances. As is typical, the dependent variable
was lagged by one year. Although patent issuances is not a perfect
measure of innovation, it is considered by scholars to be more than
adequate because a substantial sum of new inventions and processes
are patent protected.179 So as innovation increases so should the num-
ber of patents issued. For the sake of rigor, the study verifies the re-
sults using a secondary dependent variable of R&D spending. After
all, the patent system is meant to incentivize actors to invest and en-
gage in activities leading to innovation and patents, which require
R&D spending.180 The Patent and Trademark Office makes data for
total patent issuances publicly available,181 while the Organization
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) tracks R&D
data.182
As for the independent variables, the statistical design analyzes
several ways that antitrust intensity might influence the U.S. level of
innovation. The first independent variable measures the effect of pri-
178. See generally Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement
at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209 (2005) (providing a good
discussion about the history and trajectory of antitrust enforcement in the United
States).
179. See, for example,, Jeffrey L. Furman et al., The Determinants of National Innova-
tive Capacity, 31 RES. POL’Y 899, 909 (2002), using patent issuances as its depen-
dent variable and noting that patent issuances are an imperfect measure.
However, the authors sought to alleviate this concern by demonstrating that the
variable is statistically robust, likely constitutes the best possible measure of in-
novation, and reflects the industry standard for measuring innovation.
180. Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Com-
petition, and the Challenges of International Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347,
349 (2013) (discussing the essential relationship between R&D and innovation).
181. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963–2015, U.S. PATENT & TRADE-
MARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm
[http://perma.unl.edu/A33E-GGF7].
182. Gross Domestic Spending on R&D, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm [http://perma
.unl.edu/VWZ5-KG5V].
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vate antitrust actions. Considering that privately initiated antitrust
lawsuits are the most common type, the treatment tests how increases
and decreases of the annual number of privately filed antitrust law-
suits impacts innovation. The number of private antitrust lawsuits per
year is derived from the Annual Reports of the Judicial Business of
the United States Courts.183
In terms of FTC and DOJ actions, as opposed to private lawsuits,
government antitrust intensity is reflected in several ways. These
variables measure the types of investigations and complaints filed, in-
cluding variables reflecting specific areas of antitrust enforcement.
The DOJ provides publicly available data for the number of antitrust
investigations conducted by the agency for (1) merger investigations
(section 7 of the Clayton Act), (2) restraint of trade investigations (§ 1
of the Sherman Act), and (3) (attempted) monopolization claims (§ 2 of
the Sherman Act).184 In addition to investigations, data were also ob-
tained for the number of section 7, § 1, and § 2 cases filed by the DOJ
through FOIA requests.
Another variable, governmental enforcement, is a dummy variable
reflecting whether the observed enforcement occurred before or after
the agencies sought to incorporate innovation into their organiza-
tional missions. If this variable proves statistically significant and
positive, it would suggest that crafting a targeted campaign to remedy
diminished innovation is efficacious. Otherwise, the study may show
that antitrust bolsters innovation but as an unintended yet positive
externality. (Of course, there could be no statistically significant rela-
tionship between antitrust and innovation.)
This research also analyzes the intensity of the government’s anti-
trust presence. It does so by measuring the size of antitrust’s “admin-
istrative state,” using variables such as the FTC’s and DOJ’s annual
budgets, the number of lawyers, and number of other personnel em-
ployed. Although none of these variables perfectly captures the pres-
ence of government regulators in a certain year, the proxy measures
are reasonable depictions of intensity when taken as a whole. This
data was gathered from a number of sources: the FTC’s and DOJ’s
websites,185 FOIA requests, and third-party research.186
183. Various issues of the reports were used. See Judicial Business of the United
States, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (select the link to each report to access yearly data).
184. See Division Operations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-
operations (last visited Jan 11, 2018) (select the link to each decade of workload
statistics to access ten-year data).
185. Data for the FTC’s annual budget and full-time employees from 1979 to 2016 are
available on the agency’s website. See FTC Appropriation and Full-Time
Equivalent (FTE) History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bu-
reaus-offices/office-executive-director/financial-management-office/ftc-appropria-
tion [http://perma.unl.edu/NU8T-C63J]. Data on the FTC’s employment history
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To accurately test these relationships, a number of control vari-
ables were incorporated.187  In this case, the control variables known
to affect innovation and patent issuances are gross domestic product
per capita, education level, time, and economic openness.188 The degree
to which a country is integrated into the global economy is considered
a factor leading towards increased innovation.189 More economically
open societies tend to have more established relationships with other
countries and multinational firms, increasing the likelihood that for-
eign firms will choose to innovate in that country and foreign workers
in the R&D sector will relocate to that country.190 Economic openness
is measured as a proxy by the U.S. level of international trade, which
is available along with GDP per capita from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.191 GDP per capita is important because
was found using a freedom of information request and supplemented by the
agency’s Annual Competition Reports, which also included data on budgets. See
Annual Competition Reports, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/re-
ports/policy-reports/annual-competition-reports (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (select
the link to each report to access yearly data). Figures for the DOJ’s Antitrust
Division’s annual appropriations are available from 1903 to present. Appropria-
tion Figures for the Antitrust Division, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
atr/appropriation-figures-antitrust-division [http://perma.unl.edu/2XD2-REEK].
186. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al., Department of Justice Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 1955–1997: An Empirical Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG. 75, 78–79 (2000)
(providing data regarding the number of antitrust cases initiated by the DOJ oc-
curring each year).
187. Empirical research can fail to properly capture a relationship by omitting control
variables that actually affect the dependent variable. If an independent variable
proves to be statistically significant after the study controls for variables that
have been shown or are likely to affect the dependent variable, then the study
may conclude that the independent variable causally influences the dependent
variable.
188. Furman et al., supra note 179, at 912 (regressing innovation with GDP, R&D,
economic openness, and scientific capacity as measured by science and technology
journals); Eric C. Wang, Determinants of R&D Investment: The Extreme-Bounds-
Analysis Approach Applied to 26 OECD Countries, 39 RES. POL’Y 103, 107 (2010)
(testing R&D expenditures against GDP and human capital stock as measured by
education levels); see, e.g., Jonathan P. Doh et al., Foreign Research and Develop-
ment and Host Country Environment: An Empirical Examination of U.S. Interna-
tional R&D, 45 MGMT. INT’L REV. 121, 139–40 (2005) (regressing R&D levels with
education and wealth).
189. Razeem Sally, Why Openness to Trade Matters, WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/09/why-openness-to-trade-matters [http://
perma.unl.edu/P2UL-MLX7] (“Trade and investment . . . drive[ ] productivity and
innovation by exposing firms to international competition, expertise and
technology.”).
190. Id.
191. See DataBank World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://databank
.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators (last vis-
ited Jan. 11, 2018).
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wealth is thought to attract and generate innovation.192 Perhaps the
most important factor causing innovation and R&D is human capi-
tal.193 Human capital entails the capacity of a country’s personnel to
perform knowledge-based work; this variable can take many forms but
typically refers to a country’s education level or people employed in
the science and technology sectors.194 Here, human capital is repre-
sented by education level, measured by the percentage of Americans
who have obtained a college education. The Census Bureau collects
and provides education data.195 Time is a control variable that in-
creases by one per year. The rationale is that the U.S. economy has
increasingly moved towards the service sector—which embraces R&D
and innovation—producing, all things considered, more patent
issuances.196
The study also controls for patent strength. Doing so is imperative
because, over the course of the studied period, U.S. patent law has
changed.197 Certain iterations of the Patent Act might have more ef-
fectively stimulated innovation, R&D, and patents than others. To ac-
count for this spoiler, a control variable is used to reflect the strength
of U.S. patent law in a given year. The variable is a composite index
developed by Park, which is the industry standard of patent
strength.198
192. See Furman et al., supra note 179, at 908 (controlling for GPD per capita because
it reflects a country’s technical sophistication).
193. Sam Youl Lee et al., Innovation, Human Capital, and Creativity, 14 INT’L REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 13, 14 (discussing the essential role of human capital in generating
innovation).
194. See Per Davidson & Benson Honig, The Role of Social and Human Capital
Among Nascent Entrepreneurs, 18 J. BUS. VENTURING 301, 305 (2003) (explaining
the theoretical foundation for human capital producing innovation and economic
development).
195. Educational Attainment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/ed-
ucation/educational-attainment/data/tables.2017.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)
(select each year to access tables of annual data) .
196. For instance, the number of patents applied for and issued by the USPTO has
uniformly increased almost every year. See supra note 181.
197. For instance, in 2011, Congress enacted the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act,
which substantially altered the patent system by turning the Patent Act from a
“first to invent” system into a “first to file” system. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The Act had
several other important consequences as well. See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Patent
Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 654 (2013) (discussing how the Act sought to
prevent parties from joining certain unrelated and inconvenient patent litigation
suits).
198. Walter G. Park, International Patent Protection: 1960–2005, 37 RES. POL’Y 761
(2008).
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2. Statistical Methods
The statistical methods used by this analysis include poisson anal-
yses and ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regressions. A poisson treat-
ment is appropriate when the dependent variable is count data. Count
data is a type of variable that is positive and increases by one after
each observed action.199 Here, each patent issued is an independent
occurrence that increases the dependent variable, patent issuances, by
one. Although the first method is likely the more appropriate statisti-
cal test, OLS has been the prominent statistical method used by stud-
ies that have tested the production of innovation and R&D.200
To understand how this Article interprets the data, in each of the
following models, a positive coefficient indicates that as an indepen-
dent variable increases, so too does the dependent variable. A negative
coefficient demonstrates an inverse relationship, meaning as the inde-
pendent variable rises, the dependent variable decreases (or vice
versa). The bolding of certain coefficients reflects that a coefficient is
statistically significant. The number of asterisks following the bolded
coefficient represents the variable’s level of statistical significance. If,
for instance, a coefficient has three asterisks, this indicates that the
variables’ correlation is more than ninety-nine percent likely to be bet-
ter than random chance. In important part, the poisson analyses and
OLS regressions produce substantially the same results, increasing
the confidence that can be had in the findings.
C. Deductions, Conclusions, and Implications
The results of the models are consistent, strong, and quite unex-
pected. First, antitrust lawsuits by private parties—which are the
most common type of antitrust actions—impede innovation. The num-
ber of private antitrust lawsuits filed in federal courts has a strong
negative relationship with the rate of patent issuances. This is true
whether testing the relationship using a poisson or OLS analysis. It
also remains consistent when switching the dependent variable from
patent issuances to R&D spending. See Table 1 for the results. Al-
though one could argue that this relationship is over inflated since
antitrust lawsuits tend to peak during economic-crisis years, it must
be noted that economic variables were included to control for such in-
fluences. Instead, each relevant model produced strong results that
antitrust litigation initiated by the private sector quells innovation.
199. Take, for example, the number of cars that travel down a street in an hour. Each
car counts as one, and the passing of each car is a unique event from the other
cars.
200. See, e.g., Doh et al., supra note 188, at 130–31 (using regression analysis to gauge
the determinants of R&D spending over time); Polavarapu M. Rao et al., R&D
Offshoring in Multinational Enterprises: Relevance of Transaction Cost and Inter-
nalization Theories, 22 COMPETITIVENESS REV. 376, 386 (2012).
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Table 1: Results of Models 1 and 2
Poisson OLS
Model 1 Model 2
Patent Issuances
Private Lawsuits -.0002704*** -30.90216***
(0.0000017) (10.23471)
Time -.0314872*** 3044.577
(.0004535) (2370.494)
Patent Strength -.604127*** -93169.43***
(.0035647) (17801.99)
College Education .0000152*** 13.42605***
(0.00000043) (2.847128)
GDP Per Capita 0.0000023*** -5.506797**
(0.000000336) (2.35196)
Trade -.0116686*** 127.4241
(.0002754) (1759.433)
Constant 15.11408*** 176622.1
(191642.8) (194023.7)
R-Squared 0.9649***
Pseudo R-Squared 0.9533***
Observations 51 51
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Second, the research provides interesting insights into the govern-
ment’s efforts: different types of antitrust actions are shown to render
profoundly different effects on the rate of innovation. Challenges
under the Clayton Act (merger reviews) promote innovation while
Sherman Act lawsuits (restraint-of-trade and monopolization claims,
and in the case of the FTC, the counterpart FTC Act suits) tend to
cause innovative markets to retract. In Models 4 and 7, merger en-
forcement is shown to have a strong and positive relationship with in-
novation. The variable is statistically significant at the .01 level,
meaning that an increase of merger enforcement is very likely to boost
innovation.201 To further validate this finding, the merger enforcement
variable was swapped out: instead of measuring this variable with
merger investigations, an unreported model used the annual number
of merger cases actually filed by the DOJ. The results were the same,
as merger enforcement was positive and statistically significant at the
.01 level.202
201. The coefficient for Clayton 7 intensity was statistically insignificant when re-
gressed against R&D spending, which is likely due to the low number of observa-
tions (33) in that model.
202. Please contact the author for the complete results to this model. The coefficient
for Clayton 7 actions filed when regressed against patent issuances was 1725.558
and significant. Sherman 1 investigations continue be statistically insignificant.
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Table 2: Results of Models 3 and 4
OLS OLS
Model 3 Model 4
Patent Issuances
Antitrust Intensity -.0001596**
(.0000723)
Clayton 7 178.9424***
(45.17095)
Time 5140.651** 6245.128
(2372.508) (4162.936)
Patent Strength -89621.63*** -76017.9***
(19006.59) (20071.23)
College Education 16.3219*** 18.62245***
(3.126481) (3.331331)
GDP Per Capita -5.632674** -7.790338***
(2.505176) (2.714722)
Trade -135.9304 -1252.605
(1876.075) (1633.828)
Constant 36509.85 -127844
(191642.8) (288787.8)
R-Squared 0.9458*** 0.9569***
Observations 51 45
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 3: Results of Models 5 and 6
Poisson Poisson
Model 5 Model 6
Patent Issuances
Antitrust Intensity -.0000000051***
(.00000000019)
Clayton 7 .0012866***
(.00000723)
Time -.024736*** -.034065***
(.000449) (.000768)
Patent Strength -.64111*** -.586448***
(.0038096) (.0040026)
College Education .0000398*** .000044***
(.00000423) (.000000532)
GDP Per Capita -.00000518*** -.0000236***
(.000000337) (.000000395)
Trade -.0170235*** -.0228795***
(.0002705) (.0002688)
Constant 14.77881*** 14.57367***
(.0379938) (.0540246)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.9599*** 0.9700***
Observations 51 45
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Even more interesting, this effect becomes stronger after the anti-
trust agencies explicitly made promoting innovation a part of their
joint policy. When including the dummy variable government enforce-
ment—representing whether enforcement occurred before or after the
antitrust agencies sought to increase the rate of invention—the Clay-
ton Act appears more effective. Model 7 demonstrates that Clayton 7
investigations remain positive and statistically significant and so too
does government enforcement. Because this relationship grew stronger
after the FTC and DOJ expressly sought to challenge mergers ad-
versely affecting innovation, the statistical inference is that merger
enforcement fosters innovation, but even more so as a function of DOJ
and FTC policy.
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Table 4: Results of Models 7 and 8
OLS OLS
Model 7 Model 8
Patent Issuances
Gov’t Enforcement 57668.67*** -31812.83**
(12006.24) (15347.87)
Clayton 7 155.544***
(36.25557)
Sherman 1 -44.72643
(92.10625)
Time 1324.743 8451.466
(3465.848) (5593.295)
Patent Strength -61774.4*** -65172.45**
(16236.78) (27688.7)
College Education 7.956483** 18.529***
(3.457061) (4.392406)
GDP Per Capita -1.022394 -7.267724**
(2.578249) (3.186053)
Trade -3302.265** -1073.819
(1367.74) (1914.975)
Constant 170320.3 -233739.9
(237928.5) (385719.4)
R-Squared 0.9735*** 0.9454***
Observations 45 45
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
However, efforts by the agencies to stimulate invention and discov-
ery by remedying restraint-of-trade and (attempted) monopolization
claims have been less successful. Although these lawsuits have not
generally harmed innovation, they appear statistically unrelated to
patent issuances or R&D spending. In Model 10, investigations under
§ 1—i.e., restrain-trade actions—are statistically insignificant to pat-
ent issuances. In terms of § 2 investigation, the models render the
same insignificant results. Moreover, government enforcement be-
comes negative when the model tests Sherman 1 investigations
(Model 8). However, when the dependent variable is R&D spending
instead of patent issuances, § 2 actions produce a negative relationship
with innovation.203 At best, attempts to foster innovation using the
Sherman Act are ineffective but potentially deleterious.
203. Please contact the author for the complete results to this model. The coefficient
for Sherman 2 investigations when regressed against R&D spending is -.0120566
and significant. Sherman 1 investigations continue be statistically insignificant.
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Table 5: Results of Models 9 and 10
OLS OLS
Model 9 Model 10
Patent Issuances
Sherman 2 373.1717
(322.3127)
Sherman 1 6.868857
(92.44538)
Time 1335.426 1783.328
(4694.81) (4769.912)
Patent Strength -79661.7*** -79879.39***
(23429.91) (27900.92)
College Education 13.04308*** 13.0771***
(3.523769) (3.66724)
GDP Per Capita -5.522506* -5.508856**
(3.096953) (3.201407)
Trade -2280.192 -1734.307
(1955.013) (1968.477)
Constant 188108.4 168627.7
(325375.1) (347469)
R-Squared 0.9412*** 0.9391***
Observations 51 45
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
To understand these results, it appears that the contrasting theo-
ries proffered by antitrust’s advocates and detractors both have merit.
On one hand, antitrust fosters incentives to innovate when it pre-
serves the number of firms competing within a market via merger re-
views; however, innovation diminishes when antitrust enforcement
scrutinizes how firms compete via conduct cases. This makes sense.
Commentators note that the Sherman Act is suspicious of many activ-
ities in which innovative firms typically engage, as an inventor may
draw the ire of antitrust enforcers by either excluding competitors
from using her invention204 or, on the other hand, entering into con-
tracts and agreements with competitors to license or develop technol-
ogy.205 The antitrust agencies have, in fact, an entire set of guidelines
204. Although inventors do generally have fairly strong rights to exclude, they may
suffer liability under certain conditions, such as the case study supra section
IV.B.
205. Antitrust law proscribes certain anticompetitive behaviors to exclude competi-
tion. However, the opposite behavior of working with competitors can also draw
antitrust scrutiny. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITORS (2000) (explaining the
situations in which agreements and joint ventures among competitors violate
antitrust).
870 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:829
dedicated to regulating licensing agreements of IP.206 Because anti-
trust law may expose even good faith inventors to liability, it explains
why enforcing the Sherman Act diminishes innovation. As a result,
antitrust appears to promote innovation when it maintains competi-
tion by preserving the number of firms competing within a market,
but it retards innovation when it limits how exactly those firms com-
pete against each other.
Third, the analysis supports concerns that the FTC’s and DOJ’s
mere presence in dynamic markets can systemically chill incentives to
innovate. As the administrative state of antitrust increases—mea-
sured by budgets, investigations, actions, and personnel—the innova-
tive intensity of private industry retracts. The first model (Models 3
and 5), which uses joint annual budgets of the agencies adjusted into
current dollars as a proxy for antitrust intensity, finds that the varia-
ble reduces patent issuances. This same result was found when the
dependent variable was switched from patent issuances to R&D
spending.207 In case representing antitrust intensity with the agen-
cies’ joint budget is an inaccurate measure, other proxies were used as
well. Replacing the agencies’ joint budget with the number of lawyers
employed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division produced the same negative
and statistically significant result.208 To offer an analogy, when a po-
lice officer is visibly present by the highway, cars passing down the
highway become more likely to drive below the speed limit, adopting
overly conservative behaviors. In the innovation context, a similar ef-
fect appears to be true: although stationing antitrust regulators in in-
novative markets makes some firms abide by the law, others may
become overly conservative, reducing innovation below a rational
level. Part VI briefly explains this phenomenon in greater detail using
behavioral economics theory.
Fourth, the results provide a telling story about market structure,
indicating that restrictions on market behavior tend to interfere with
innovation. Not only does the analysis demonstrate that most anti-
trust variables diminish innovation, but interestingly, so do stronger
patent rights. Despite its facially unintuitive nature, this finding is
consistent with research arguing that patent strength can traverse be-
yond an optimal level, limiting downstream innovation.209 So as pat-
206. 2017 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 75.
207. For the sake of space, not all models are reproduced in the Article. Please contact
the author with questions about results of models not found in this Article. The
coefficient for antitrust intensity as measured by the agencies’ combined budget
was -1.25 and statistically significant when regressed against R&D spending.
208. The DOJ lawyers variable was statistically significant at .01 and negative at
-158.8073. Please contact the author for complete results of this model.
209. See Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public
Benefit, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (remarking that there is an optimal
level of patent protection that scholars have sought to find).
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ent strength and antitrust intensity increase, both variables expose
firms to greater levels of risk and costs which can make the activity of
innovation less profitable and, thus, less likely.210 Given these effects,
this finding contributes to the market-structure debate by finding that
the best predictor of innovation is not necessarily competition or ex-
clusion but perhaps freedom. The question, then, is the optimal
balance.
The control variables had semi-predicted effects on innovation. For
instance, as the U.S. rate of college education increases, so too does
innovative output. The time variable, though, was generally insignifi-
cant.211 The only unexpected result from the control variables was
that GDP was generally negatively related to innovation, though GDP
is a blunt measure which correlates with numerous other variables.
It should also be noted that this was not a “large-n” study, meaning
that the results are based upon fewer observations than is typically
desirable. (Statistically, the more observations, the stronger the re-
sults.) That said, American antitrust enforcement exists in a bounded
reality, limiting the number of observations that can be studied. Also,
any concerns about this study’s accuracy should be alleviated by the
strength, consistency, and robustness of the results. The measures
generally present a surprisingly high level of statistical certainty, sug-
gesting that the models reflect reality. Although this statistical treat-
ment was originally intended to serve as an entry point for future
research, the strength of the results contributes to the patent and an-
titrust literatures. Future analyses on this subject are especially en-
couraged in light of these findings.
D. Conclusion
The analysis produces several findings. The agencies’ authority to
review anticompetitive mergers is the primary area in which antitrust
law has promoted innovation. This effect is even stronger since the
agencies made innovation their express policy. However, lawsuits
targeting how firms interact and conduct business—whether initiated
by the government or private parties—tend to lessen innovation. Sci-
entific progress is also harmed as the agencies increase in size, pres-
ence, and intensity. Considering that stronger patent rights have a
210. See Courtney C. Scala, Making the Jump from Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How
Patent Pools Can Facilitate the Development of Pharmacogenomics, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 1631, 1641 (2009) (discussing how the proliferation of patents can create an
“anticommons” which can discourage innovation and R&D).
211. See R&D and Innovation in Services, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. (Mar. 2012), http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/knowinnoinnoservprojectrdandin-
novationinservicessecondexpertmeetingagenda.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/
XGR2-QSAK] (noting that in recent years some countries with a large service
sector receive more than seventy percent of their GDP from R&D).
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similar negative effect, the analysis indicates that raising the level of
risk and cost in dynamic markets—even if such regulatory regimes
are meant to cultivate innovation—have the opposite effect. Indeed,
firms appear to be the most innovative when they are the least ex-
posed to liability.
VI. POLICY, LEGAL, AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
AND PROPOSALS
The results of this study have powerful implications for the policy,
law, and theory of antitrust law, which the following proposals ex-
plore. Of particular note, this Part addresses the law of litigating inno-
vation as an antitrust violation, the joint policies of the DOJ and FTC,
the role of market structure as a predictor of innovation, and evidence
suggesting that unobstructed markets may generate the most innova-
tion. Each suggestion is ideally intended to increase technological ad-
vancement and scientific discovery.
A. Increasing Innovation by Eliminating Liability for
Cooperative Agreements to Use IP
  The empirical analysis contributes to the debate about how market
structure shapes the incentives to innovate by finding a novel and im-
portant relationship: markets are the most innovative when they are
less burdened by regulation. Innovation was shown to decline as pat-
ent strength expands, the number of private antitrust lawsuits in-
creases, antitrust regulators become more prominent, and the
agencies undertake additional investigations and cases. These find-
ings, though, are quite logical: as each factor increases in number or
magnitude, so does the exposure of firms to liability. In light of this,
how should the regulatory system be reformed to lessen the costs of
invention?
Borrowing from economics and behavioral-economics theory, the
FTC and DOJ should take a cautious or passive approach to regulat-
ing innovative markets. Economic theory indicates, simply put, ra-
tional actors are less likely to engage in an activity as its cost
increases. Contributing psychological research to this framework, be-
havioral economics suggests that the human brain is, in certain situa-
tions, hardwired to make irrational decisions (e.g., overvaluing certain
qualities, underestimating costs, engaging in risky behaviors that the
odds do not support).212 One of the most important contributions of
212. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“Not all investors are rational.”); Frederick C. Dun-
bar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 455, 471–72 (2006) (discussing the emergence of behavioral economics to
counter the traditional view of rational investors).
2018] INNOVATIVE ANTITRUST 873
behavioral economics is prospect theory, which explains that actors
are “loss averse,” meaning they prefer options framed in terms of ben-
efits as opposed to losses even if both options are equal. This is be-
cause, according to Tversky and Kahneman’s seminal research, a loss
engenders a disproportionally greater emotional reaction.213 Here, as
the DOJ’s and FTC’s attention to dynamic markets sharpens, firms
can be expected to dial back their efforts to innovate beyond what is
necessary. After all, the potential risk of antitrust scrutiny is likely to
create a reaction greater than the actual magnitude of the liability. So
despite the best intentions of the FTC and DOJ, their presence may
make firms irrationally temper their rate of innovation.
In terms of reforms, simple changes can be made to the FTC’s and
DOJ’s policies governing IP licensing agreements—i.e., the Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (the Guidelines),
which should enhance the willingness of firms to create, and profit
from, innovation.214 As a starting point, the most striking issue is that
patent holders have a clearer right to exclude competition than to deal
with competitors.215 This is problematic because the licensing of pat-
ents stimulates innovation on two fronts: (1) it promotes the sharing of
technology, leading to downstream innovation, and (2) it makes in-
venting more profitable since patent holders can derive revenue from
the licensing itself.216 But despite the overwhelming benefits of licens-
ing, the agencies’ skepticism of certain licensing agreements has cre-
ated a mosaic of liability. Examples of conduct that may draw the ire
of regulators include IP contracts among competitors, exclusive-deal-
ing arrangements, and other licensing deals that raise prices or re-
duce output.217
The first desirable reform is to eliminate the agencies’ suspicion of
licensing agreements among competitors. The problem is that firms
can more safely refuse to license their IP—a conduct that actually
does impede innovation—than monetize their art via a licensing
agreement.218 In many instances, firms might choose to avoid making
deals that would aid the proliferation of technology out of fear of draw-
213. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
214. 2017 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 75, at 3.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.h., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (“A patentee has the right to exclude others from profiting from
the patented invention. This includes the right to suppress the invention while
continuing to prevent all others from using it, to license others, or to refuse to
license . . . .” (citations omitted)).
216. 2017 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 75, at 5.
217. Id. at 8 (“Licensing arrangements raise concerns under the antitrust laws if they
are likely to affect adversely the prices, quantities, or varieties of goods and ser-
vices either currently or potentially available.” (citations omitted)).
218. Id. at 15 (“The existence of a horizontal relationship between a licensor and its
licensees does not, in itself, indicate that the arrangement is anticompetitive.
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ing antitrust review. In fact, in markets with few firms, a competitor
may be one of the few parties that can plausibly license the technol-
ogy. By casting suspicion on these agreements, the agencies not only
reduce the potential profitability of inventing but also expand the
scope of liability, chilling the incentives to innovate. And since the em-
pirical results cast doubt on whether such actions promote innovation,
allowing competitors to freely license technology should aid the spread
of technology, incentivize downstream innovation, and increase R&D
investment.
Second, the agencies are skeptical of joint research ventures
among competitors. According to agency guidelines, the agencies’ pro-
tocol is to determine whether sufficient competition exists to counter
the group’s collaboration to help gauge its appropriateness under anti-
trust law.219 As a starting point, since it is unlikely that firms would
collaborate on a research project to produce inferior innovation, inno-
vation arising out of collaboration can be expected to benefit consum-
ers. And since competition is not a public good that arises only with
the aid of antitrust law, competitors would likely be able to defeat the
collaboration if it rendered inferior products. Due to this logic, judging
R&D joint ventures under antitrust law is likely to generate the oppo-
site effect of diminishing technological advancement; after all, the cur-
rent guidelines have created a perverse situation that firms might
have to defend an antitrust claim based upon their joint ability to gen-
erate desirable innovation. The argument made here is that so long as
firms retain independence without forming a cartel to fix prices, their
efforts to share ideas, research, and technology should carry the
strong presumption of benefiting consumers.
Third, the agencies should avoid litigating restrictive terms in IP
licensing agreements. In attempting to monetize and protect one’s pat-
ented technology, licensing deals that impose terms that limit compe-
tition or potentially raise prices should avoid exposure to antitrust
liability. For example, currently, the FTC and DOJ are suspicious of
Identification of such relationships is merely an aid in determining whether there
may be anticompetitive effects arising from a licensing arrangement.”).
219. Id. at 13. (“The Agency would consider the degree of concentration in the relevant
research and development market and the market shares of the parties to the
joint venture. If, in addition to the parties to the joint venture (taken collectively),
there are at least four other independently controlled entities that possess com-
parable capabilities and incentives to undertake research and development of bi-
odegradable plastics, or other products that would be close substitutes for such
new plastics, the joint venture ordinarily would be unlikely to adversely affect
competition in the relevant research and development market. If there are fewer
than four other independently controlled entities with similar capabilities and
incentives, the Agency would consider whether the joint venture would give the
parties to the joint venture an incentive and ability collectively to reduce invest-
ment in, or otherwise to retard the pace or scope of, research and development
efforts.”).
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contract terms that grant the licensor the right to use any improve-
ments or items that the licensee devised from the licensed technology,
known as a “grantback” provision.220 Their concern is that the licen-
see may be less likely to innovate if the licensee must license any new
inventions back to the licensor.221 The problem is that the agencies’
policy creates liability for firms that are willing to grant each other
open licenses to use, and benefit from, their technologies. Although
certain grantbacks may have the effect of discouraging an isolated in-
ventor from innovating, their overall effect is such a net positive that
prospective liability has likely generated far more harm from deter-
ring licensing agreements than any countervailing benefits.
Similar to grantbacks, an exclusivity term should be considered
per se legal. Licensing agreements that prevent the licensee from us-
ing any other party’s technology—in effect, bonding the licensee to
only the licensor’s technology—are currently susceptible to invalida-
tion.222 The patent’s very utility, though, is exclusivity. Although an
exclusivity agreement may appear anticompetitive, it actually ex-
pands the class of users who may use the patented technology beyond
just the patent holder. Whether the term unreasonably limits the li-
censee from pursuing other products is a decision best left to the licen-
see. And given the countervailing harm of initiating Sherman Act
claims against licensees, compared to the benefits of such agreements,
the agencies should avoid subjecting restrictive terms to scrutiny even
if they appear to have anticompetitive effects.
B. Innovation Should Be Per Se Legal
A firm can incur antitrust liability for inventing technology that
the courts or agencies deem to be anticompetitive.223 The general rule
is that an innovation or product design that lessens competition with-
out a substantive pro-competitive justification offends antitrust
law.224 For instance, an inventor may design two products to work
best, or exclusively, with each other to increase the demand of both
220. Id. at 33 (“A grantback is an arrangement under which a licensee agrees to ex-
tend to the licensor of intellectual property the right to use the licensee’s im-
provements to the licensed technology.”).
221. Id. (“If the Agencies determine that a particular grantback provision is likely to
reduce significant licensees’ incentives to invest in improving the licensed tech-
nology, the Agencies will consider the extent to which the grantback provision
has offsetting precompetitive benefits . . . .”).
222. Id. at 29.
223. See generally Stacey Dogan, The Role of Design Choice in Intellectual Property
and Antitrust Law, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 101, 101 (2016) (“When is it appropriate
for courts to second-guess decisions of private actors in shaping their business
models . . . ?”).
224. See United States v. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that
an innovation can violate antitrust if there are no precompetitive benefits to off-
set excluding competition).
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products beyond a competitive level.225 Similar to this, the debate in
the third case study concerned whether a superficial innovation of a
drug meant to extend one’s market power could violate the Sherman
Act; the concern was that consumers are more harmed by the loss of
generic competition than benefitted from minor drug reformations.226
But despite the seemingly anticompetitive nature of certain inno-
vations, scholars have argued that antitrust should defer to the inven-
tor or risk deterring innovation.227 With respect to product hopping,
the court in Warner Chilcott cautioned that such litigation threatens
to chill innovation because now firms must consider whether an inno-
vation that improves an existing product, but perhaps not overwhelm-
ingly so, can be attacked on antitrust grounds.228 In support of this
position, consider the risk of liability that arose from a product im-
provement in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.229 The court in C.R.
Bard noted that, although the defendant may have improved the man-
ner in which its medical device loads hypodermic needles, the defen-
dant’s “real reason” for modifying the device was to raise the costs on
competitors who supplied replacement needles.230 The court held that
the jury could have reasonably determined the defendant’s product
improvement was “restrictive or exclusionary.”231
The effect of this antitrust standard explained in C.R. Bard, how-
ever, distorts and increases the costs of innovation by forcing inven-
tors to consider and accommodate their competitors’ preferences when
developing or improving technology. Further, based upon the empiri-
cal results, this Article agrees with the language in Warner Chilcott
that attaching liability to product improvements is unlikely to incen-
tivize innovation but instead may create burdensome liability in dy-
namic markets. Because innovation is thought to generate more
consumer benefit than preserving competitive prices, the courts must
avoid diminishing the incentives to innovate by giving technological
advancements the presumption of legality. This Article argues that
the sole quality a court should test is whether the innovation rendered
an improvement. If the innovation provides such a consumer benefit,
then this should establish an absolute defense to liability—after all,
225. John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 681, 683 (2012) (“The archetypical design-conduct challenge alleges
that a firm, dominant in one product market, designed a new version of that
product so as to maximize interoperability with its own complementary prod-
uct(s), essentially requiring customers to buy the two together.”).
226. See supra section IV.C.
227. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
228. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott, No. 12–3824, 2015 WL 1736957, at *16
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), aff’d, 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
229. 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
230. Id. at 1382 (Mayer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. Id.
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the imposition of liability is likely to diminish innovation more than it
promotes competition.
C. Reforming the FTC and DOJ’s Joint Antitrust Policy
Another concern is that selecting a case for enforcement when anti-
trust is poorly equipped to provide a remedy risks the harm of over-
enforcement. This discussion proposes ways to enhance the agencies’
pursuit of innovation based upon the empirical findings of Part V. As a
starting point, the empirical analysis finds that the agencies’ mandate
to challenge anticompetitive mergers under the Clayton Act generates
significant innovation, justifying the public costs of enforcement. No-
tably, section 7 lawsuits increase the rate of innovation even when the
primary objective is to remedy a traditional anticompetitive effect.
This indicates that the agencies’ merger policy should continue with-
out adjustment.
But since the same cannot be said of exclusionary conduct law-
suits—which were statistically unrelated to R&D spending and patent
issuances—a policy change may be appropriate. The most effective re-
form would likely entail how the agencies identify and select restraint-
of-trade cases to litigate.
First, the agencies should limit promoting innovation to markets in
which the costs and barriers of innovation are significant. This is usu-
ally the situation in industries animated by higher levels of patent
issuances and other R&D-related activities. The agencies have instead
asserted claims alleging that a restraint of trade diminished innova-
tion in markets unknown for R&D and technological progress such as
the real estate brokerage market in Columbia, SC.232 The problem
with using antitrust enforcement to preserve innovation in industries
with low barriers to innovation is that, without IP protection, opportu-
nities and incentives remain for competitors to develop new or substi-
tute products. In contrast, industries saturated with patent thickets
force companies to spend substantial resources innovating around es-
tablished patented technologies.233 In these markets, the nature of in-
novation is competition. So when a dominant firm uses a restraint of
232. Complaint at 12, United States v. Consol. Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., No.: 3:08-
CV-01786-SB, 2009 WL 3150388 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009) (alleging that an organi-
zation of real estate brokers that denies membership to applicants who might
want to compete for listings using innovative methods have the effect of “sup-
pressing innovation”).
233. See Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379,
415–16 (2012) (“A patent thicket arises when multiple patents with overlapping
scope cover the same product. Similarly, an anticommons exists when inputs to,
or steps in the manufacture of, a final product were individually patented by mul-
tiple inventors. In both situations, the fragmented nature of patent rights im-
pedes innovation because a company hoping to sell a product must negotiate
licenses with multiple patent owners or risk suit for patent infringement.”).
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trade to further increase its rivals’ costs of R&D, a competitor might
choose to either forbear from investing in R&D or spend excessive re-
sources navigating around the patent thicket, taking resources away
from other projects—or the firm could abandon the market
entirely.234
Second, innovation-antitrust lawsuits should target industries
with a small number of participants. A restraint of trade has a greater
chance of rendering systemic effects reducing innovation when the
challenged act stems from one of the few competitors in the market.
This is because the transaction costs borne to creating a new stream of
R&D tend to be substantial. When numerous actors exist, chances are
greater that a rival could use or adopt current R&D operations to com-
pete against those involved in an anticompetitive practice.235 The co-
rollary is that a restraint of trade between two parties in a three-
competitor market is more likely to systemically harm innovation
since fewer actors will be positioned to compete against the arrange-
ment.236 Although antitrust regulators should still challenge anticom-
petitive arrangements in markets with numerous participants, the
agencies should base this decision upon remedying traditional an-
tirust injuries such as increased prices.
D. The Uncertain Law of Innovation in Antitrust
Enforcement
As mentioned, private antitrust lawsuits must allege an antitrust
injury. Although numerous antitrust suits have pled harms to innova-
tion, all private suits surviving the summary judgment stage have, so
far, also alleged a conventional harm to competition.237 The conse-
quence is that formidable barriers prevent antitrust lawsuits from
promoting innovation—that is, unless the law is clarified or amended.
234. Id.
235. See supra section IV.A, which discusses the concerns of the FTC when the two
competitors in catheter market sought to merge. After their merger, the vacuum
of competition generated disincentives for the surviving firm to invest in R&D. In
fact, the company began curtailing its efforts, resulting in actual diminished in-
novation. See supra section IV.A.
236. See supra section IV.A. Without transaction costs, this would be substantially
less of a problem. After all, when a competition void exists, one could expect com-
petitors to arise. However, when substantial transaction costs exist to enter a
market, they may either dissuade third parties from entering the market, pre-
serving the dominant firm’s monopoly or, even if additional firms do enter, it may
take many years until they are able to produce a competitive product.
237. CollegeNET, Inc. v. Common Application, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1149 (D. Or.
2015) (stating that the court has found no record of a plaintiff being able to bring
an antitrust lawsuit based exclusively upon a lack of innovation and that all law-
suits pleading decreased innovation have incorporated traditional antitrust inju-
ries as well), rev’d and remanded, 711 F. App’x 405 (9th Cir. 2017).
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Whether innovation alone can, or should be able to, support an an-
titrust lawsuit is a critical inquiry. There are numerous instances in
which a plaintiff may struggle to prove a challenged act has caused
prices to increase or output to diminish but could, however, present
evidence that innovation was harmed. A classic example is the preda-
tory pricing scheme. In a predatory pricing scheme, the defendant sets
a good’s price at an unsustainably low level meant to cannibalize the
market share of competing goods; once the predation phase drives
competitors from the market, the good’s price is then raised to a level
reflecting the predator’s newfound monopoly power.238 In this situa-
tion, courts have typically failed to find an antitrust violation because
predatory pricing renders, at least initially, lower prices, which bene-
fit consumers.239 For example, in Energy Conversion Devices Liquida-
tion Trust,240 the court dismissed a complaint alleging the defendant
perpetrated a predatory pricing scheme because “unreasonably low
and/or below-cost pricing does not harm competition and, thereby,
confer antitrust standing by itself,” giving no attention to the plain-
tiff’s claim of reduced innovation.241 In light of this, by formally incor-
porating innovation concerns into antitrust jurisprudence, the law
could, perhaps, preserve competition when the challenged activity has
a tenuous connection with prices and output.
The problem is that the empirical analysis casts tremendous
doubts on whether private antitrust lawsuits have any ability to pro-
mote innovation. Not only do greater levels of private litigation cause
markets to become less innovative, but the research suggests that
Sherman Act lawsuits also have a deleterious effect. A fair inference is
that the courts should refuse to grant antitrust standing to plaintiffs
whose exclusive injury is reduced innovation. After all, the research
suggests that the opposite effect of imperiling innovation is the more
likely outcome.
238. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2013) (“In its most basic form, predatory pricing is a
two-step strategy for securing monopoly profits. During the predation phase, the
firm charges a price below its costs in the hopes that its competitors will be un-
willing or unable to sustain the losses they would incur if they matched the be-
low-cost price and will exist the market. After the rivals are vanquished, the post-
predation phase begins. With the market to itself, the dominant firm charges a
monopoly price with the goal of recouping the losses it sustained during the pre-
dation phase and then earning a steady stream of excess profits into the future.”).
239. TI Inv. Servs., LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 451, 463 (D.N.J. 2014)
(noting that over-enforcement of predatory pricing claims could have a “chilling
effect” on producers who may other want to cut prices, an effect that enhances
consumer welfare).
240. Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Tr. v. Trina Solar Ltd., No. 13–14241,
2014 WL 5511517 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2014).
241. Id. at *3.
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Possibly, though, the law has only created the appearance that pri-
vate lawsuits have failed to influence the rate of innovation because
alleging such an injury has heretofore been insufficient to initiate an
action. This has likely discouraged plaintiffs from pursuing innovation
under antitrust law. If one were able to allege innovation as their ex-
clusive claim, then plaintiffs may be more likely to initiate meritorious
lawsuits, increasing innovation. Considering this potential, plaintiffs
should have a route to do so.
The following proposal is a two-route test to determine whether a
private lawsuit may establish antitrust standing based upon a claim
of reduced innovation. Because the analysis produced such a pessimis-
tic view of the relationship between innovation and private antitrust
lawsuits, the test is designed to allow a very limited number of claims
to proceed. A private party should be able to litigate innovation, as
will be explained, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that reduced inno-
vation comports to a conventional antitrust injury of either dimin-
ished output or higher prices.
First, a plaintiff should be allowed to plead diminished innovation
if the plaintiff can show that the relevant market is not overly satu-
rated with products. If introducing an innovative good into the market
would effectively supplant existing products, then innovation may
have a tenuous effect upon supply and variety. But to the degree that
the relevant market can support additional items, the very nature of
innovation is likely to increase output.242 A plaintiff may thus show
that a restraint of trade has stifled innovation in such an unsaturated
market that output would increase, establishing standing.
Second, a plaintiff should be allowed to proceed with a restraint-of-
trade lawsuit based upon harm to innovation if the plaintiff can
demonstrate the restrained innovation would have produced a cheaper
good than what currently exists. This is often not the case. Because
innovative goods are generally superior to preexisting products, the
nature of innovation tends to introduce more expensive products to
the market.243 As more innovative technologies enter the market, the
prices of older products do not necessarily have to decline; in some
situations, the older products exit the market and, in other instances,
their prices remain constant, serving as a cheaper alternative to the
innovative item. In either circumstance, innovation can increase the
aggregate price of goods. However, on occasion, a good’s innovation is
242. United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (ex-
plaining that a decrease in innovation could probably be considered an output
restriction, which would create standing under antitrust law).
243. See, e.g., Mark Sullivan, Here’s Why Apple’s 10th Anniversary iPhone Will Likely
Cost More than $1,000, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.fastcompany
.com/3068004/heres-why-apples-10th-anniversary-iphone-will-likely-cost-more-
than-1000 [http://perma.unl.edu/Q6EB-FBCR].
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its more efficient manufacturing process, rendering essentially a
cheaper version of the same or substitute item.244 In turn, if a plaintiff
demonstrates that the restrained innovation would have generated a
cheaper alternative, then anticompetitive behavior has effectively
raised prices. Thus, a restraint of trade that blocks cheaper goods cre-
ates the effect of artificially maintaining higher prices, establishing a
conventional antitrust harm under the FTC and Sherman Acts.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article contributes one of the first empirical assessments of
antitrust’s recent application to innovation policy. The greatest threat
posed to firms possessing market power tends to come from more inno-
vative products. Given this, dominant firms have sought to prevent
innovation in order to preserve their position. For instance, some
firms have merged with rival innovators in order to consume the inno-
vative firm’s R&D operations. Others have used restraints of trade to
limit the marketability of innovative products. In either situation, in-
novation can be considered competition that entrenched firms would
like to prevent; consequently, antitrust law’s capacity to promote com-
petition can preserve these incentives to innovate.
The foregoing research empirically tests the relationship between
antitrust and patent laws, finding first that the government’s enforce-
ment of section 7 of the Clayton Act has a statistically significant ca-
pacity to drive innovation. The strength of this relationship over a
sixty-year period provides resounding evidence. Even more important
is that the variable indicating the government’s purposeful efforts to
stimulate innovation is also statistically significant. Exclusionary con-
duct cases tried under the Sherman Act (and FTC Act) by the agencies
and private parties have been significantly less successful. Although
such actions may not uniformly harm innovation, they do not foster it
either. Adding to this story, as the administrative state of government
antitrust increases, patent issuances and R&D spending retracts.
Based upon these findings, the major conclusion is that antitrust’s
most powerful means of promoting invention and scientific progress is
by preserving the number of firms competing in a market. That said,
innovation is harmed whenever antitrust lawsuits target the activities
of firms in dynamic markets. Supplemented with behavioral-econom-
ics theory, firms appear loss-averse to the degree that they avoid ag-
gressively innovating if antitrust liability is the potential penalty.
244. See Rachel Schramm, Oracle Seeks to Streamline Datacenter, Foster Innovation
and Lower Prices, SILICON ANGLE (Jan. 28, 2015), http://siliconangle.com/blog/
2015/01/28/oracle-seeks-to-streamline-datacenter-foster-innovation-lower-prices
[http://perma.unl.edu/95XL-63NE] (demonstrating how companies can seek to be
more efficient and sell goods in greater scale, reducing prices).
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This contributes to the market-structure debate by demonstrating the
importance of market freedom to incentivizing invention.
This Article argues that antitrust could better promote innovation
if it reduced the risk of liability for conduct that tends to proliferate
innovation, even if the conduct embodies some exclusionary elements.
The imposition of liability seems to create more harm by chilling the
incentives to innovate than the benefits provided by remedying an iso-
lated exclusionary practice. As such, inventors should have greater
freedom to collaborate with competitors in joint research ventures, in-
novate improvements to their technology, and license patented tech-
nology to competitors.
The conclusions found herein will hopefully influence future schol-
arly research on the nexus between innovation, antitrust, and the pat-
ent system. It should also provide guidance to practitioners who can
use these findings to evolve antitrust law and policy. Furthermore, the
author hopes that this Article’s data and results can aid future re-
search efforts.
